Evolving Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific: A Realist and Sea Power Analysis of India’s Maritime Security Strategy

Call for Articles
Contact Us

EVOLVING GEOPOLITICS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC: A REALIST AND SEA POWER ANALYSIS OF INDIA’S MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY

Authors: Dipmala Roka, Debajit Boruah & Japungsar Basumatary

Publication: The Calcutta Journal of Global Affairs, Volume 10, Number 3 (September 2026), © 2026

Publisher: Research Centre for Eastern and North Eastern Regional Studies, Kolkata (CENERS-K)

ABSTRACT

The Indo-Pacific region has become a critical theatre in contemporary geopolitics, marked by competing strategic interests, expanding naval presence, and intensifying power rivalries. As the region hosts critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), growing military infrastructure, extensive trade routes, and abundant natural resources, its evolving geopolitical landscape has added significant complexity to the existing regional security framework. The study provides a theoretically grounded analysis of the evolving power structure in the Indo-Pacific, emphasising shifting strategic partnerships and emerging patterns of maritime competition and cooperation among the major players. Employing the analytical perspectives of Realist theory and Mahanian Sea Power theory, the study examines how naval expansion, maritime domain control, and sea-lane security priorities influence state behaviour and regional strategic outcomes. It argues that India’s maritime strategic posture can be understood as a balancing response within a rapidly intensifying security environment defined by India–China rivalry and broader major-power competition. By integrating classical strategic thought with contemporary geopolitical developments, the study demonstrates the continued explanatory relevance of realist and sea power frameworks in interpreting present Indo-Pacific security dynamics and the evolving regional security architecture.
Keywords: Indo-Pacific geopolitics, maritime security, Realist theory, Sea Power theory, India’s maritime strategy

INTRODUCTION

The Indo-Pacific has emerged as one of the most significant strategic regions of the twenty-first century, encompassing critical maritime trade routes, considerable economic potential, and security dynamics shaped by great power competition and regional geopolitical tensions, thereby shaping global power dynamics and redefining contemporary security discourse. As a geopolitical construct, the Indo-Pacific links the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a single strategic unit, reflecting the growing interconnectedness of critical sea lines of communication, economic networks, and security interests.

Currently, the Indo-Pacific is at the forefront of global strategic attention due to its crucial sea lines of communication, rich natural resources, and vital maritime chokepoints. Consequently, maritime security has become a central concern, including the protection of trade routes, management of territorial disputes, prevention of illegal maritime activities, and the growing presence of military and non-state actors. These factors contribute to a complex security environment marked by strategic competition, naval modernisation, and evolving security partnerships.

INTERPRETING INDIA’S MARITIME POSTURE THROUGH REALIST AND SEA POWER THEORY

The twenty-first century has witnessed a significant transformation in global geopolitics, moving decisively away from the traditional Asia-Pacific theatre toward the Indo-Pacific. This vast maritime expanse, stretching from the eastern coast of Africa to the western shores of the Americas, has emerged as the pivotal arena for major power rivalry with deep economic interactions and growing strategic uncertainty. India is at the centre of this evolving landscape. As a civilisational state rediscovering its long-overlooked maritime identity, India is aware of the strategic importance of its surrounding seas. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), once perceived with relative complacency and historically dismissed as a “British Lake,” [1] has now become a complex and contested security environment. It is shaped by rising multipolarity, nuclear asymmetry, and particularly the rapid naval expansion of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This transition is not merely a policy adjustment; it represents a fundamental reorientation of India’s grand strategy, necessitating a rigorous theoretical interrogation of the mechanics of state behaviour in an era of acute uncertainty. Interpreting India’s maritime behaviour exclusively as a reaction to China’s activities offers a narrow and theoretically insufficient explanation. A more thorough analysis must look beyond immediate triggers and examine the broader forces shaping state behaviour. This includes the pressures created by an anarchic international system, the influence of India’s own strategic culture, and the enduring principles of sea power that shape maritime strategy. This study attempts to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding India’s maritime security strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

The study contends that no single international relations theory is adequate to explain the full complexity of India’s strategic behaviour. Instead, a comprehensive analytical framework is required that synthesises the structural insights of Neorealism, the competitive dynamics emphasised in Offensive Realism, the domestic-level explanations offered by Neoclassical Realism, and the enduring strategic principles of classical Sea Power Theory. These perspectives provide a comprehensive and holistic understanding of India’s evolving role in the Indo-Pacific. By bringing these theoretical perspectives together, the study explains how India manages the “security dilemma” in the Indo-Pacific Region. It argues that although the broader international structure compels India to balance against China, the country’s long-standing preference for strategic autonomy shapes its balancing techniques. As a result, India adopts a nuanced strategy centred on “hedging” and “internal balancing,” rather than entering into rigid and formal military alliances. The study further connects these International Relations theories to India’s naval operational doctrine, showing that the country’s movement between “Sea Control” and “Sea Denial” strategies reflects a deeper tension. India’s Classical Realist desire for status and influence contrasts with its Structural Realist constraints due to its limited material capabilities. This study draws on historical patterns, current defence procurement patterns, and key doctrinal frameworks, including the 2015 SAGAR vision and the 2025 MAHASAGAR initiative, to present a comprehensive and holistic model of India’s evolving maritime statecraft.

The shift from the term Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific is far more than a linguistic or semantic shift; it reflects a calculated and deliberate strategic effort to dilute China’s perceived centrality in regional geopolitics. Historically, geopolitical regions have been fluid, metaphorical constructs shaped by shifting power dynamics. [2] In the contemporary context, major powers such as the United States, Japan, Australia, and India have promoted the Indo-Pacific framework to conceptually unify the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a single strategic domain. This reconceptualisation aims to construct a wider security architecture capable of diffusing the concentration of power in Asia and elevating India as a pivotal player in the emerging regional order. For India, the Indo-Pacific framework performs a clear structural realist function. Extending its strategic orientation to the Pacific enables India to reduce the asymmetry it faces vis-à-vis China within the Indian Ocean. The framework also enables India to strategically align and collaborate with like-minded maritime countries, particularly the United States, Japan, and Australia, who share apprehensions regarding China’s rising influence. The evolution of India’s engagement with this conceptual shift occurred when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh first referenced it in 2012, the Indian Navy incorporated it into its 2015 maritime doctrine, and Prime Minister Modi articulated it at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018. Together, these milestones underscore India’s acknowledgement that security in the Indian Ocean is inseparable from the shifting power politics of the Pacific.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is the primary arena where these strategic developments are unfolding. It encompasses 38 countries, is home to about 65% of the world’s population, and contributes nearly 62% of global GDP. [3] The IOR also constitutes one of the world’s most important energy corridors, transporting about two-thirds of global oil shipments and one-third of all bulk cargo. For India, the IOR is not just a vital trade route but a key security concern. The region’s importance is reinforced by the presence of several narrow and sensitive waterways, including the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Bab-el-Mandeb, and control over these passages grants a major strategic advantage; any disruption in these areas can pose serious risks for national security.

Strategic pressures in the IOR have intensified largely due to the growing presence of major and extra-regional players. For nearly a century and a half, the region functioned as a “British Lake,” with Britain maintaining a unipolar and relatively stable maritime order, and its withdrawal coupled with China’s rise created a structural vacuum that has since been filled with new forms of competition. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was launched in 2013 and since then has been expanding its network of dual-use ports and facilities—often described as the “String of Pearls”—has shifted the regional balance of power. These developments have deepened the security dilemma of the littoral states and now significantly shape India’s strategic responses in the IOR. Viewed through the broad lens of realism, the Indo-Pacific constitutes a profoundly anarchic environment. With no overarching authority to enforce rules or guarantee security, states must rely on their autonomous capability development, partnerships, and strategic choices to safeguard their national interests. For India, navigating this turbulent Indo-Pacific order necessitates a calibrated blend of internal balancing, external alignment, and maritime capacity-building, reinforcing the enduring logic of realist thought in shaping contemporary geopolitics.

Kenneth Waltz’s Structural Realism (Neorealism) provides the foundational framework for understanding how India perceives threats in the Indo-Pacific. According to this approach, the international system is characterised by anarchy without any central authority. [4] In this view, all states are functionally similar, and their primary goal is to ensure their survival. For India, China’s rise marks a significant shift in Asia’s power balance. Structural realism suggests that when one state, such as China, accumulates significant power, it will naturally try to extend its influence. This, in turn, prompts neighbouring states such as India to engage in balancing activities to preserve their security and prevent strategic marginalisation. The rapid modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and its expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean have created a classic security dilemma. Actions taken by China to protect its energy sea routes, such as building ports in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Djibouti, are perceived by India as strategic moves that could encircle India and limit its freedom of movement and action in the region. Structural realism asserts India’s “Maritime Pivot” not as a voluntary policy shift, but as a response demanded by the evolving international system. In an anarchic environment, India is compelled to focus on relative gains—that is, how its naval power compares to China’s—rather than on the broader economic benefits from trade. The fear that another state may act aggressively with offensive intentions, inherent in the very logic of anarchy, pushes India to strengthen and modernise its navy even when it has no intention of initiating conflict. As John Mearsheimer argues, in an anarchic system, “states inherently possess some offensive military capability” and “no state can ever be certain another state will not use its offensive military capability.” [5] India’s development of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) such as the INS Arihant and its pursuit of nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) under Project 77 demonstrate responses to this structural uncertainty. [6]

Waltz contends that states respond to rising hegemons through balancing, pursued either internally or externally. Structural realism thus helps explain India’s refusal to align with China, for instance, by joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or accepting Chinese dominance in the region. Despite the considerable economic gap between the two countries, India has consistently rejected the BRI, interpreting it as a geopolitical tool for expanding China’s influence and constraining India’s strategic autonomy. India has instead opted for a balancing approach. Through internal balancing, it has strengthened its domestic military capabilities to reduce the power gap with China. This includes projects such as building indigenous aircraft carriers, such as the INS Vikrant, and increasing production of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile system. [7] Simultaneously, India practices external balancing or zone balancing [8] by deepening security partnerships with major powers such as the United States, Japan, and Australia to counter China’s growing influence. [9] However, structural realism doesn’t fully explain why India avoids joining any formal military alliance. If China posed an existential threat in purely structural terms, Waltzian theory would predict India’s willingness to form or accept a NATO-style alliance. Yet India remains committed to the principle of strategic autonomy, consistently avoiding binding alliance commitments. This indicates that structural pressure does not fully determine India’s foreign policy behaviour. Instead, India’s responses are mediated by domestic threat perceptions, leadership preferences, and long-standing strategic traditions. These intervening variables reveal the limits of structural realism and point to the need for a neoclassical realist framework.

John Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism offers a more assertive elucidation of state behaviour. It suggests that great powers constantly seek to maximise their power to achieve regional hegemony. According to this perception, China is viewed as a revisionist power that aims to take over Asia and replace the United States’ hegemony. India is aware that if a Chinese hegemon in East Asia were to project overwhelming military and economic power into the Indian Ocean in the future, its strategic autonomy and sovereignty would be in jeopardy. [10] As a result, the primary objective of India’s grand strategy is to stop China from becoming the dominant force in the region. India understands that China can reroute its enormous capabilities westward into the Indian Ocean, significantly changing the balance of power in India’s immediate maritime domain once it secures its eastern border, especially by controlling the South China Sea and settling the Taiwan dispute. [11] Another major idea of offensive realism is “buck-passing,” which refers to the tendency of states to shift the burden of balancing a rising aggressor onto others to protect their own resources. The major dynamics within the Quad can be effectively interpreted through this theoretical lens. The United States aims to transfer a substantial share of the responsibility for containing China to capable regional partners, particularly India and Japan, which allows the United States to conserve resources and manage global commitments effectively. The US perceives India as a “Net Security Provider” in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), reflecting a conscious effort to entrust key maritime security responsibilities to India.

China’s rise in the region creates strong balancing pressures. However, India’s historical experiences with colonialism and the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War have fostered a durable strategic culture of “strategic autonomy.” This has helped India to pursue a hedging strategy: deepening security cooperation with the United States for deterrence (including high-end technology and intelligence sharing) while simultaneously maintaining diplomatic and defence ties with Russia (for legacy platforms and continental stability) and engaging China through institutions such as BRICS and the SCO. Additionally, Neoclassical Realism helps explain India’s calibrated engagement with the Quad, as India participates to signal its resolve, enhance capacity, and contribute to regional balance, while also resisting alliance commitments that could constrain its foreign policy autonomy. India’s naval modernisation has long been impeded by “sea blindness” [12] and bureaucratic inertia. However, the shift from the “Look East” to the “Act East” policy, along with the introduction of the 2025 MAHASAGAR doctrine, marks a major change in leadership perceptions under the Modi administration. [13] This shift has enabled more effective resource mobilisation for the maritime domain. The push for Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) in defence, exemplified by indigenous initiatives such as aircraft carrier construction and the SSN programme, further reflects a neoclassical realist dynamic, where the state seeks to build autonomous capabilities, understanding that dependence on alliances would weaken the persistent domestic preference for strategic autonomy.

Classical Realists, such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Morgenthau, emphasise human nature, lust for power, and the pursuit of prestige. [14] In this tradition, the Indian Ocean is not merely a strategic theatre for India; it is a civilisational sphere of influence. K. M. Panikkar, a foundational figure in Indian maritime thought, argued in 1945 that “India never lost her independence till she lost the command of the sea.” Panikkar’s insight reflects a distinctly Classical Realist outlook. [15] He conceptualised the ocean as an inherent domain of Indian power, essential to the country’s rise as a major player. The aircraft carriers like INS Vikrant, INS Vikramaditya, and the proposed IAC-2 have often been dismissed by structural realists as outdated in the contemporary missile-dominated environment. However, from a Classical Realist perspective, these platforms carry symbolic value that surpasses operational metrics. A carrier battle group projects prestige, psychological influence, and national confidence. The MAHASAGAR initiative (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), announced in 2025, further aligns with this classical logic. [16] It posits India not only as a net security provider but also as a leader of the Global South. This initiative reflects a classical realist ambition to develop a sphere of influence in which India’s leadership is both recognised and legitimised by other regional players.

To fully operationalise a realist framework, it is useful to integrate it with Sea Power Theory. Realism explains why states perceive threats and pursue certain security strategies, while Sea Power theory explains how these strategies are executed in the maritime domain. The central constraint in India’s maritime strategy lies between the aspirational Mahanian objective of sea control and the pragmatic Corbettian emphasis on sea denial. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), argues that national greatness depends on controlling the sea to protect trade and constrain adversaries. [17] India’s maritime stance remains heavily influenced by Mahanian thinking, particularly its emphasis on controlling strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca in the east and the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb in the west. By dominating these strategically important narrow chokepoints, India can put China’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma” at risk, threatening China’s energy lifelines in the event of a high-intensity conflict. India’s continued investment in carrier battle groups (CBGs) despite the challenges posed by Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems reflects the persistence of this Mahanian legacy.

Julian Corbett, in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911), offered a more nuanced perspective on naval power, arguing that “Command of the Sea” is often temporary. He emphasised the concept of sea denial—preventing an adversary from using the sea without necessarily controlling it oneself—and highlighted the critical interdependence between land and sea operations. Indian maritime strategy incorporates Corbettian principles of Sea Denial in its foreign policy. India is investing heavily in submarines (Project 75I, Project 77 SSN) and anti-ship missiles (BrahMos) to create “no-go” zones for the PLAN. This strategy demonstrates how a relatively weaker naval power can leverage geography and asymmetric capabilities to deny access to a stronger adversary. Since 2015, India’s approach has evolved from an exclusive focus on sea control to a mixed strategy, emphasising sea denial in the deep ocean while retaining sea control in littoral waters. This adaptation reflects a structural realist recognition of capability limits. Corbett famously asserted that “men live on the land and not on the sea,” underscoring that naval operations must ultimately serve continental objectives. India faces a unique “two-front” dilemma with Pakistan and China, which spans both land and maritime domains. Against Pakistan, the navy can exercise sea control to offset stalemates on land. Against China, however, the naval domain functions as a secondary front to the Himalayas. Corbettian theory thus validates India’s strategy of using its navy to threaten China’s maritime lifelines, thereby easing strategic pressure on the land border. Official documents, including the Indian Maritime Doctrine, continue to stress sea control, carrier operations, and power projection, which reflects the Classical Realist pursuit of status and influence. However, the decision to pause the expansion of the aircraft carrier fleet (delaying IAC-2) in favour of prioritising nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and advanced missile systems (BrahMos) signals a pragmatic recognition that sea denial represents a more operationally viable posture against China in the Indian Ocean. Classical realism seeks prestige through carriers and overt control of the seas, while structural realism prioritises survival through asymmetric capabilities such as submarines and sea denial. Thus, in the current evolving geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific, India rhetorically aspires to Mahanian grandeur but pragmatically invests in Corbettian realism—talking like Mahan, but buying like Corbett.

Neorealism asserts that states must build their own power to ensure survival. India’s transition from a “Buyer’s Navy” to a “Builder’s Navy” represents this principle. [18] The Make in India initiative in defence is not merely an economic programme; it functions as a strategic imperative aimed at reducing dependence on foreign suppliers. The acquisition of advanced diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) with air-independent propulsion (AIP) addresses the immediate need for stealthy patrols of strategic chokepoints. [19] Collaboration with Germany’s TKMS underscores India’s effort to expand its diversified technology sources. [20] The approval of two nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) equipped with hypersonic missiles marks a significant strategic quantum leap. Unlike SSBNs, which are primarily designed for deterrence, SSNs are offensive hunter-killers capable of shadowing PLAN carrier groups in the Indian Ocean and penetrating China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) defences. [21] Neoclassical realism explains India’s external engagements as mediated by its strategic autonomy, resulting in nuanced and calibrated diplomacy. India resists framing the Quad as an “Alliance of Containment,” instead pursuing zone balancing—strengthening regional capacities to constrain China without entering into formal military commitments. From an offensive realist perspective, India’s refusal to patrol the South China Sea reflects how it deliberately avoids becoming the U.S.’s “buck-catcher.” While India accepts U.S. intelligence cooperation (e.g., P-8I interoperability) and advanced technology to enhance its capabilities, it consistently refrains from engaging in conflicts on America’s behalf in the Indo-Pacific region.

STRENGTHENING INDIA’S MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY

There is no single definition of India’s maritime power in the strategic thinking of Indian thinkers. One of India’s earliest maritime strategists, K. M. Panikkar (1945), stated that Indian security and geopolitical influence lay at the core of control of the Indian Ocean. Panikkar believed that India’s emergence as a major power is intricately linked with sea power in India’s surrounding waters. For this reason, it is an indispensable part of the country’s security. On this basis, C. Raja Mohan (2012, 2015) contends that India is not striving to be a regional master, but has adapted to the geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century. Mohan believes that China’s naval presence, especially in the Indian Ocean, its strategic investments in dual-use ports, and its growing influence through the Maritime Silk Road have made India rethink its maritime strategy and increase its naval strength. [22] This view frames India’s maritime strategy as a balancing strategy for maintaining a stable regional balance of power and ensuring India’s national interest. [23]

David Brewster (2018), on the contrary, claims that India’s maritime policy has been characterised by defensive realism. India’s main objective is to protect the waters of the Indian Ocean Region from the influence of foreign powers and guarantee the security of shipping rather than to assert maritime dominance. Likewise, Harsh V. Pant (2019) argues that India’s naval modernisation is primarily for strategic considerations, not expansionist motives. Pant believes India’s maritime strategy aims to strike a balance against China’s growing assertiveness and maintain regional stability through strategic partnerships, multilateral engagement, and international maritime norms. [24] These views illustrate that some strategic community members still debate India’s maritime aspirations and thus warrant increased attention to India’s maritime security in any realist analysis.

India’s official maritime doctrines and strategic policy documents can serve as further pragmatic evidence for realism. The Indian Navy’s Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015) clearly spells out India’s maritime policy goals as Security of National Interests, Protection of Indian Maritime Security, Freedom of Navigation, Maritime Domain Awareness, and Maritime Stability in the Indian Ocean Region. The strategy focuses on deterrence, cooperation for security, capacity building, and maritime partnerships, rather than territorial expansion. [25] Similarly, India’s maritime activities such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), and enhanced cooperation in the Quad show India’s inclination towards a balance of partnerships while keeping strategic autonomy intact. [26, 27]

Another empirical aspect is the growing reliance on maritime connectivity for India’s economic development and energy security. About 90–95% of India’s external trade by volume and nearly 70% of India’s crude oil imports pass through the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) that travel through the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Malacca. [28] Thus, uninterrupted use of these water chokepoints has become a strategic imperative, not merely an economic interest. [29] Geopolitical competition, regional disputes, piracy, terror, and sea coercion would have a significant impact on India’s energy security, economic strength, and national growth. Accordingly, the growing strength of India’s naval forces—including aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, anti-submarine warfare platforms, surveillance systems, and maritime domain awareness—can be viewed as logical steps to protect these important maritime interests. [30]

INDO-PACIFIC AND INDIA’S STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN AN EVOLVING GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ is not universally accepted. However, it is a space of competition rather than purely a zone of peace—a strategic space in which the major players aim to shape the regional balance of power in accordance with their national interests. [31] The United States sees the Indo-Pacific as a free, open, connected, prosperous, secure, and rules-based region according to international law, freedom of navigation, and the rules of the road. The United States Indo-Pacific Strategy aims to “enhance alliances, bolster deterrence, foster regional partnerships, and challenge China’s growing military and economic footprint in the region.” [32] Realist thinkers believe this is a way to maintain the status quo in a region and to avoid the rise of a regional hegemon. [33, 34]

The concept has also been encouraged by Japan, which focuses on its vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), highlighting the importance of respecting international law, freedom of navigation, connectivity, quality infrastructure, and maritime cooperation. [35] In contrast to the U.S., Japan focuses more on economic development, institutional cooperation, and ASEAN centrality, as well as expanding strategic partnerships with regional democracies for a stable regional order. [36, 37] Australia also champions an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific based on a rules-based order, maritime security, supply chain resilience, and strengthened regional partnerships, while acknowledging the increasing strategic weight of China as a significant challenge to the stability of the Indo-Pacific. [38]

However, the Indo-Pacific idea is viewed differently through the Chinese lens. The Indo-Pacific strategy is often viewed by Beijing as a geopolitical ploy, manufactured by the United States and its allies, to stop China’s rise and limit its strategic influence. [39] As a result, Beijing has been making efforts to build a new regional system based on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Maritime Silk Road (MSR), and Global Security Initiative, focusing on “economic connectivity, infrastructure construction, and mutually beneficial cooperation.” [40] However, many strategic analysts argue that China’s growing naval modernisation, military presence in Djibouti, and strategic investments in ports like Gwadar, Hambantota, and Kyaukpyu have changed the strategic picture in the Indian Ocean and in the Indo-Pacific. [41] ASEAN, on its part, offers another interpretation by promoting inclusivity, dialogue, economic cooperation, multilateralism, and ASEAN centrality to prevent great power competition. Instead of containment or strategic competition, ASEAN calls for “Indo-Pacific cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution” within an international legal framework. This is in response to the concerns of smaller and middle powers not wanting to become strategic battlegrounds of competition between larger powers. [42, 43]

In this changing geopolitical scenario, India’s understanding of the Indo-Pacific is unique. While the US has pursued a balancing approach and China has promoted an alternative picture of a “region of regions,” India has consistently advocated for the Indo-Pacific region to be “free, open, inclusive, rules-based, and ASEAN-centric,” with the Indian establishment stating that it would “never join exclusive military pacts” and “will not fall for any containment strategy.” [44, 45] India’s Indo-Pacific vision, clearly stated in 2018 at the Shangri-La Dialogue by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is not to target any specific country, but to promote the ideals of collective security, freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and sustainable regional development. It is a testament to India’s age-old foreign policy doctrine of “strategic autonomy”—a policy that aims to maintain independent policy-making while simultaneously maintaining good relations with several stakeholders.

This escalation of strategic competition between the United States and China, however, has greatly restricted the strategic options of India. Competition for maritime control, technological supremacy, strategic supply routes, military cooperation, and regional influence has given rise to intricate strategic challenges for India. [46] With respect to maritime domain awareness, defence interoperability, and Quad enhancement, India is pursuing increasing strategic convergence with the United States, Japan, Australia, and France to maintain a stable maritime order, strengthen the Quad, and increase the interoperability of defence forces. Conversely, India has not joined any military alliances. It aims to keep its foreign policy flexible in its relations with other countries, engaging with multiple powers such as the Gulf nations, ASEAN, Russia, and even China in areas of mutual interest. [47]

India’s strategic autonomy has evolved from Cold War non-alignment to multi-alignment in the post-Cold War era. Instead of maintaining equidistance from competing powers, India is increasingly pursuing multiple strategic partners while retaining independent decision-making power. This can be seen in India’s engagement with the Quad alongside its ongoing engagements with other institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), BIMSTEC, and ASEAN-led mechanisms. This multi-directional interaction helps India get the best of both worlds and utilise strategic leverage without becoming overly reliant on a single power centre. [48, 49] India’s strategic autonomy is an approach of ‘calibrated balancing.’ It is exemplified through its current maritime initiatives such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), strengthening maritime domain awareness, defence indigenisation under Atmanirbhar Bharat, and maritime cooperation with France, Australia, Japan, and the United States. They aim to enhance the Indian Navy’s strength and flexibility, ensuring that India is ready to meet changing geopolitical threats without being dependent on other nations.

CONCLUSION

The Indo-Pacific is a theatre where theory intersects with high-stakes reality. India’s maritime security strategy is not a purely reactive response to regional developments; rather, it constitutes a novel exercise in realist statecraft. The structural realities of anarchy are addressed through internal balancing and sea denial, while simultaneously navigating the distribution of power via strategic autonomy and selective engagement. India’s approach in the anarchic waters of the Indo-Pacific reflects a pragmatic understanding that self-help is indispensable. The integration of realist and sea power principles provides the intellectual framework for India’s emergence as a pivotal maritime power in the twenty-first century. In this context, the neoclassical realist framework demonstrates that geography and systemic pressures set the stage, but domestic choices ultimately determine the outcome.

ENDNOTES & REFERENCES

  1. The term “British Lake” refers to the historical dominance of the British Empire over the Indian Ocean sea lanes, which led the region to be viewed as secure and largely uncontested under British naval control. For further details, refer to Mahan, A. T. (1900). The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies.
  2. Donnelly, J. (2000). Realism and International Relations. Cambridge University Press.
  3. Durai, S. (2025). India’s Maritime Vision: From SAGAR to Indo-Pacific to MAHASAGAR. Embassy of India Report, Timor-Leste.
  4. Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley.
  5. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company.
  6. Immerman, E. (2016). Direct Verification of Nuclear Weapons and the Secrecy-Certainty Spectrum (Doctoral dissertation). Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
  7. Vatsyayan, R. (2025). Indian Naval Modernization: A Transformation in Motion. Raksha Anirveda (Policy brief/working paper).
  8. Zone balancing in the Indo-Pacific refers to regional states strengthening their own capabilities and forming intra-regional partnerships to counter a rising power and maintain the balance of power without relying solely on an external hegemon. For further details, refer to Gogoi, Chuchengfa & Singh, K. Harsh (2025). The Clash of Giants: India and China in the Neo-Realist Struggle for Indo-Pacific Dominance.
  9. Gogoi, Chuchengfa & Singh, K. Harsh (2025). The Clash of Giants: India and China in the Neo-Realist Struggle for Indo-Pacific Dominance. Lyceum India Journal of Social Sciences.
  10. Mearsheimer, op. cit.
  11. Donnelly, op. cit.
  12. “Sea blindness” refers to the persistent lack of strategic awareness and political prioritization of maritime security and naval power in national defence planning. For further details, refer to Durai, S. (2025). India’s Maritime Vision: From SAGAR to Indo-Pacific to MAHASAGAR. Embassy of India Report, Timor-Leste.
  13. Durai, op. cit.
  14. Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Alfred A. Knopf.
  15. Panikkar, K. M. (1945). India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History. George Allen & Unwin.
  16. Durai, op. cit.
  17. Donnelly, op. cit.
  18. Morales, P. C. (2025). India’s Foreign Policy Reconfiguration: From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment. Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 324, 1–7.
  19. Kapur, L. (2021). DPG Policy Brief (Vol. VI, Issue 16). Delhi Policy Group.
  20. Kapur, op. cit.
  21. Joshi, Y. (2023). Searching for relevance: The evolving role of the Navy in India’s military strategy. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 19(3), 278–301.
  22. Mohan, C. R. (2015). Modi’s Naval Diplomacy. ISAS Insights, 277. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.
  23. Mohan, C. R. (2012). Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; (Walt, 1987).
  24. Pant, H. V. (2019). India’s National Security: Challenges and Dilemmas. McGraw-Hill Education.
  25. Ministry of Defence. (2015). Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), Government of India.
  26. Ministry of External Affairs. (2019). Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). Government of India.
  27. Pant, op. cit.
  28. Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways. (2023). Annual Report 2022–23. Government of India.
  29. Kaplan, R. D. (2010). Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. Random House.
  30. Brewster, D. (2018). India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean. Oxford University Press.
  31. Medcalf, R. (2020). Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region. Manchester University Press.
  32. U.S. Department of Defense. (2019). Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. U.S. Department of Defense.
  33. Mearsheimer, op. cit.
  34. Waltz, op. cit.
  35. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2023). Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Government of Japan.
  36. Medcalf, op. cit.
  37. Pant, op. cit.
  38. Australian Government. (2023). 2023 Defence Strategic Review. Department of Defence.
  39. Zhao, S. (2022). China and the Indo-Pacific strategy: Regional order and strategic competition. Journal of Contemporary China, 31(135), 577–592. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2021.1979307
  40. Panda, J. P. (Ed.). (2019). India–China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World Order. Routledge.
  41. Brewster, op. cit.
  42. ASEAN. (2019). ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
  43. Pant, op. cit.
  44. Government of India. (2018, June 1). Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at the Shangri-La Dialogue.
  45. Ministry of External Affairs, op. cit.
  46. Tellis, A. J. (2017). Protecting American Primacy in the Indo-Pacific. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  47. Pant, op. cit.
  48. Pant, op. cit.
  49. Mohan, op. cit.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

  • Dr. Dipmala Roka is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Sikkim University, Gangtok. She completed her M.A. in International Relations from Jadavpur University and earned her Ph.D. from the University of North Bengal. Her areas of interest include International Relations Theory, Security and Strategic Studies, India’s Nuclear Policy, Border Studies, and India’s Foreign Policy.
  • Mr. Debajit Boruah is a Ph.D. scholar in the Department of International Relations at Sikkim University, Gangtok. He completed his M.A. and M.Phil. in Political Science from Sikkim University and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in International Relations at the same university. His research interests include Security Studies, Geopolitics, International Relations, Maritime Security, and Indo-Pacific Studies.
  • Mr. Japungsar Basumatary is a Ph.D. scholar in the Department of International Relations at Sikkim University, Gangtok. He completed his M.A. in International Relations from Sikkim University and his M.Phil. in Security Studies from the Centre for Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat. His research interests include Gender Studies, Hydro-diplomacy, and Security and Conflict Resolution.
Address

CENERS-K, S-73, Unnayan, 1050/1, Survey Park, Kolkata, 700 075, India

contact@globaljournalceners.org

Browse
Current Issue Previous Issues For Referees Guidelines for Authors
Information
Ceners-K Background News Journal Overview Contact
Newsletter

Join our newsletter for updates and exclusive content.

Copyright © 2026 The Calcutta Journal of Global Affairs, All Right Reserved.