Introduction

eopolitical analysis provides crucial insights into a nation’s position among its neighbours, revealing how geography and political dynamics, shape national behaviour, intra-regionalrelations,Gand foreign policy directions. Geopolitics entails the interplay of terrain with politics, an art of statecraft thriving on geographical features like position, climate, geomorphology, coffers, etc. In the period of globalisation, classical geopolitical imagination has always been on ‘securing’ its home. A country’s security and development are greatly impacted by the way its boundaries are drawn, which is influenced by both natural and political factors. As seen by events like the Doklam standoff, which underscore the region’s ongoing security concerns, Bhutan’s high-altitude frontiers are strategically significant as a geopolitical buffer zone.1 The Eastern Himalayas form a geopolitically sensitive arc, spanning India, Bhutan, Nepal, Tibet Autonomous Region, and Myanmar. The rugged mountain passes, deep river valleys, and high-altitude plateaus covering nearly 65 percent within India and Bhutan create extreme topography of peaks over 7,000 meters, snow and monsoon that serve as natural defensive barriers while exposing vulnerabilities via narrow passes and riverine corridors.2 The Eastern Himalayas are a vital zone of connectivity, ecology, and human development, where stable borders underpin trade, hydropower cooperation, and infrastructure projects central to India’s Act East Policy and Bhutan’s development model.3 To prevent the ecological consequences of militarisation and to safeguard populations downstream, the delicate Himalayan ecosystem, rich in biodiversity and water supplies, needs a low-tension political climate.4 Borderland communities along the India–Bhutan frontier embody this human dimension: their livelihoods, cultural exchanges, and everyday mobility depend on predictable, peaceful cross-

1 Kushwaha, Sandeep Kumar. “Geostrategic Significance of Eastern Himalayan Terrain: A

Critical Analysis of India-Bhutan Border Security.” International Journal of Social Science Research (IJSSR) 2, no. 6 (December 1, 2025): 401–9.

2 Lintner, Bertil. The Costliest Pearl: China’s Struggle for India’s Ocean, 2019.

3 Sikri, Rajiv. Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy, 2009.

4 Haigh, Martin J., Jack D. Ives, and Bruno Messerli. “The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling

Development and Conservation.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 14, no. 4 (January 1, 1989): 501.

border interactions, making them both beneficiaries and informal custodians of stability. 5 A strategically important yet uncredited part in the contemporary development of Sino-Indian relations and the more general spatial and geopolitical dynamics in the region rests with the Kingdom of Bhutan. Bhutan is landlocked in the Eastern Himalayas between China and India, and remains one of the many countries in Asia to never have experienced colonisation. Due to its geographical position in the Himalayas, Bhutan, also known as Druk Yul, meaning Dragon Kingdom, has historically maintained a policy of self-isolation that has limited the influx as well as the exodus of goods, ideas, and people. India and Bhutan partake a long literal tie, but there was no direct relation between Bhutan and China, they used to communicate through Tibet. China was not a direct neighbour to Bhutan, so they used Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, as their common interaction route. Following China’s annexation of Tibet in 1951, Bhutan became a neighbour of China without much choice, and since then, Bhutanese have always feared China’s programs.6 For India-Bhutan border security, this terrain’s strategic centrality revolves around the Doklam Plateau, Chumbi Valley and around the Siliguri corridor, linking the mainland to the Northeast, positioning Bhutan’s highlands as a vital buffer offering strategic depth, early warning, and lateral mobility against threats like China’s moves on Chumbi Valley, as starkly revealed in the 2017 Doklam standoff.7 Since the 1970s, Bhutan gradually started opening its connections with both nations (India and China), but it trusted and forged ties more with India than China. Bhutan has not remained barred from the larger geopolitical developments in the Himalayan region. Owing to its position, profitable developments within Bhutan continued to be heavily connected to its bilateral relations with India. Bhutan’s public security and foreign policy have been tied to that of India, following the partition of British India in 1947, with Bhutan ceding control of its foreign policy to India via the 1949 Friendship Treaty. The Friendship Treaty was revised in 2007, changing the provision requiring Bhutan to take guidance from India in terms of foreign affairs. Bhutan transitioned from a monarchy to a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy, which eventually granted Bhutan enhanced sovereignty in its foreign affairs. China is

5 Kumar, Anand. “Achieving Regional Economic Integration in South Asia.” IDSA, 2025.

6 Kumar, Pranav. “Sino-Bhutanese relations: under the shadow of India–Bhutan friendship.” China

Report 46, no. 3 (2010): 243-252.

7 Joshi, Manoj. “Doklam: To start at the very beginning.” ORF Special Report, 2017.

intent upon gaining control of the Himalayan region.8 The most prominent are its mega-structure systems, such as roads and anchorages, developed with Chinese backing but used more to push its appetite for control over India. Beijing has pushed to strengthen its ties with Pakistan, Bhutan, and Nepal, and constructed significant military and mercenary structures near the border. China’s grim drive is not just about gaining the advanced ground, but about reshaping the balance of power, segregating India, and achieving ascendance in the region.

The History of Eastern Himalayas

The Himalayas are the well-discernible natural hedge separating the Tibetan plateau and the Indian plains. The maturity of the pre-colonial Eastern Himalayan fiefdoms was wrested during the 1770s by the Gorkhali army, substantially extending the domain of the Gorkha Kingdom. This expansionist Gorkhali army got dammed by Tibet in the north and by the British in the south. A non-aggression Treaty of Segauli was inked in 1816 that forced the Gorkhas to cede all the enthralled homes to the British. During the early seventeenth century, many Drukpa Lamas from Tibet came as politico-religious ‘deportees’ to the Eastern Himalayas in the parts of Sikkim and Bhutan. Since the state of Sikkim and the kingdom of Bhutan identify themselves as ‘Drukpa’ states, the Tibetan influence in the Eastern Himalayas became more conspicuous and obvious when the Tibetan Lamas started preaching Buddhism. From the early and mid-seventeenth century onwards, Bhutia (Tibetans) were the alternate group to settle in Sikkim, followed by the Nepalese. On the other hand, an ethnic group named Sharchops have been regarded as the foremost settlers of Bhutan. Other empires, namely –Ngalong and Khengs, constituted the core of Bhutanese Drukpa identity.9 The British signed the Sinchula Treaty with Bhutan in 1865, forcing Bhutan to cede territory in the east, which they named Duars. The British had also assumed considerable suzerainty over Bhutan in matters relating to foreign affairs through the Sinchula Treaty. The British had multifarious geopolitical intentions over the Eastern Himalayas. It ranged from developing the hills for a colony frugality, to transforming it to a base for reclamation for the British army, as well as waning down the Tibetan influence in the Eastern Himalayas. First

8 Kaplan, Robert D. The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and

the Battle Against Fate. Random House. —2012, 2018.

9 Rizal, Dhurba. “The unknown refugee crisis: Expulsion of the ethnic Lhotsampa from

Bhutan.” Asian Ethnicity 5, no. 2 (2004): 151-177.

of the geopolitical imaginings of the British towards the Eastern Himalayas in general, has been geo-profitable as its climate was conducive to produce finest rates of tea. The social imperative over the Eastern Himalayas was related to the 19th century trade route, the Royal Road to Lhasa, under the area of Sikkim. The route through the Chumbi Valley was the shortest route from India to Tibet.10 This route became geopolitically important to the British after the old trade route to Tibet, which passed through Nepal, remained dysfunctional after the Gorkha bouleversement in the late 18th century. The British took expedient of encouraging Nepalese migration from Nepal in the Eastern Himalayas as they were largely Hindus. The Lepchas were said to be the foremost settlers in the Eastern Himalayas, followed by the Bhutias and the Nepalese. By the end of the 19th century, in order to guard the Indian borders from Chinese irruption into Tibet, the British negotiated the Anglo-Chinese Convention in 1890 ‘to easily define and permanently settle certain matters related to the border between Tibet and Sikkim.’ Indo-Bhutan Treaty (1949) and Indo-Sikkim Treaty (1950) were negotiated to take the suzerainty over these Himalayan fiefdoms.11 The Indo-Nepal Treaty (1950) nearly made the borders defunct and, as a result, patronised heavy cross-border migration in the Eastern Himalayas. No sooner had the Nepalese population started adding to Sikkim under the open borders in the Eastern Himalayas. On the other hand, during the post-Independence connection phase, India entered into a Deadlock Agreement with Bhutan without officially subscribing an Agreement. After India achieved its Independence in 1947, it had upheld Bhutan’s sovereignty status, subscribing a new convention with India in 1949. This convention was inked in the wake of growing Chinese incursions in the Eastern Himalayas, and thereby, the convention had re-necessitated Bhutan to be guided by India in the matter of its defence and external affairs, also encouraged cross-border migration of people, trade, and commerce as well as equal rights in each other’s home.12

10 Zimba, Topgyal. “COLONIAL QUEST FOR TRADE IN THE TRANS HIMALAYA:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SIKKIM-DARJEELING HIMALAYAN ROUTE 1835-1904,” 2017.

11 Phuntsho, Karma. “The history of Bhutan.” (2014).

12 Phuntsho, Karma. “The history of Bhutan.” (2014).

Bhutan’s Significance between the Two Giants

he Himalayas function as a physical barrier: steep ridgelines and low-oxygen altitudes deter mass incursions by channelling threats into passes, southern foothills and valleys facilitatetrade andTpatrols, necessitating integrated management.13 Nehru’s dictum that “geography has been the most important factor in our history” aptly frames how such obstacles are transformed into assets through infrastructure like Project DANTAK. Bhutan’s connective role between India and China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region aligns with Mackinder’s Heartland theory, positioning the Eastern Himalayas as a strategic hinge of geography, population, and water resources.14 In the past, Bhutan’s location served as a buffer for India’s fragile Siliguri Corridor, shielding the Indo-Gangetic heartland from possible northern thrusts and reducing the possibility of Chinese strategic incursions into the Bay of Bengal coast.15 At the same time, Bhutan’s position in this rimland zone has also constrained any latent Indian imperial overreach by embedding India’s security role within Bhutan rather than direct territorial control; treaty-based duties mitigate hegemonic aspirations through institutionalised collaboration.16 British frontier policies first consolidated this buffer arrangement, which was later formalised by the 1949 India–Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, granting India a guiding role in Bhutan’s external affairs while preserving Bhutanese sovereignty.17 The 2007 revision of the treaty signalled a recalibration where Bhutan asserted greater sovereign agency while reaffirming deep security and economic cooperation with India. China’s growing assertiveness along Bhutan’s borders and the 2017 Doklam standoff translate these structural vulnerabilities into concrete security

13 Gansser, Augusto. “The geodynamic history of the Himalaya.” Zagros Hindu Kush Himalaya

Geodynamic Evolution 3 (1981): 111-121.

14 Mackinder, Halford J. “The geographical pivot of history (1904).” The geographical journal 170,

no. 4 (2004): 298-321.

15 Rose, Leo E. “The politics of Bhutan.” VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 13, no. 2 (1980):

171-173.

16 Kaplan, Robert D. The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and

the Battle Against Fate. Random House. —2012, 2018.

17 Rose, Leo E. “The politics of Bhutan.” VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 13, no. 2 (1980):

171-173.

crises, demonstrating how terrain and geopolitics intersect in the Himalayas.18 Doklam, located near the tri-junction of India, Bhutan, and China, is situated at a top ridge of terrain that overlooks approaches to the Siliguri Corridor; any consolidation of Chinese presence there would shorten response times, improve surveillance, and potentially outflank Indian defences, making Bhutan’s territorial integrity indispensable to India’s security calculus.19 For Bhutan, the episode underscored that cooperation with India provides both a security umbrella against external pressure and diplomatic room to pursue strategic autonomy amid sharpening great-power rivalry.20 The Doklam crisis also highlighted that the region cannot be understood solely through a militarised lens. Beijing and New Delhi both accused each other of altering the territorial status quo in the Western Himalayas; the conflicts between Chinese and Indian security forces in the Galwan Valley and the ensuing interstate tensions between China and India came in international headlines in 2020.21 The series of incidents culminated in an increased military build-up on both sides of the border and India imposing tariffs on Chinese goods and services, with the bilateral relationship being at its lowest since the Indo-Sino War in 1962.22 The continued border controversies between two nuclear powers, India’s opposition to China’s close ties with Pakistan and the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) through corridor of the Jammu & Kashmir region, in combination with a growing maritime contest in the Indian Ocean, renders the Indo- Sino border regions in the Eastern and Western Himalayas an implicit conflict. China’s plan to dominate the Himalayas seeks to work profitable enterprise to push its political claims, and, if these fail, make military conduct to ultimately secure control of the high ground.23

18 Panda, Ankit. “Why Bhutan Is the Wildcard in the Ongoing India-China Standoff at Doklam.”

The Diplomat (2017).

19 Joshi, Manoj. “Doklam: To start at the very beginning.” ORF Special Report, 2017.

20 Lama, Jigme Yeshe. “Dance of the dragons: Bhutan–China relationship.” In China in India’s

Neighbourhood, pp. 63-80. Routledge India, 2024.

21 Ranjan, Amit. “India-Bhutan Relationships: Cordial but Concerns Remain.” Artha Journal of

Social Sciences 18, no. 4 (2019): 87-101.

22 Thakker, Aman. “Sino-Indian border clashes: Implications for US-India ties.” CSIS. July 16

(2020).

23 Malik, Arif Hussain, and Nazir Ahmad Sheikh. “Changing dynamics of Indo-Bhutan relations:

implications for India.” International Journal of Political Science and Development 4, no. 2 (2016): 44-53.

The Doklam standoff, which is located at the intersection of China, India, and Bhutan, is the current geopolitical problem in the Eastern Himalayas. The Doklam region has long been used as a grazing place by Bhutanese herders. This region was never a source of contention for the British and the Chinese over border controversies. It was only after the 1962 India- China War, this region came under the limelight. Since Bhutan’s sovereignty over Doklam had been rejected numerous times by China, which perceives the region strategically important to secure the Chumbi Valley. China claims India is trespassing into the Bhutanese home at Doklam violating the Sikkim-Tibet border, ratified by the 1890 Anglo- Chinese Convention. The 2017 conflict seems to have been initiated due to BRI design, which could give China near access to the Nathu La pass.24 China geopolitically wants to revive the two thousand times old Silk Road through the Belt and Road Initiative. It indeed provides China with a longhand to the Siliguri Corridor or ‘Chicken’s Neck,’ a 27- km-long stretch created inpost-partition India, where Bengal got divided between India and Pakistan. The corridor is having important significance as it connects Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sikkim, Darjeeling hills, and the Northeast India with rest of India.25

Image taken from: - BBC https://www.bbc.com/news/world-

asia-40478813. The image shows Nathu La Pass on left and Doklam Plateau

24 Sharan, D. P. “China In Darjeeling: Potential Impetus to Doklam Tangle.” BW

BUSINESSWORLD (2017).

25 Saha, Swagata, and Sukalpa Chakrabarti. “The non-traditional security threat of COVID-19

in South Asia: an analysis of the Indian and Chinese leverage in health diplomacy.” South Asian Survey 28, no. 1 (2021): 111-132.

on right in the India-Bhutan-China tri juncture. This is a serious geopolitical location for India as Siliguri is just 150 km down from the Bhutanese home. In the geopolitical imaginings of the Indian state, any perceived ‘political trouble,’ in its borders, might jeopardise its socio-political topographies. China’s military irruptions, structure, about its territorial claims in the Himalayas reveal Beijing’s largely aggressive face when it comes to its indigenous contest with India. The 2017 standoff in Doklam, the violent clash in Galwan Valley in 2020, and the patient claims over Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin describes Beijing’s attempts to assert control over the territories.26 However, it could have the effect of undermining India’s strategic depth as well as Delhi’s growing indigenous and global influence and truly tip the scales in China’s favour. India’s unhappy assessment of Bhutan’s strategic significance, the Himalayan country might seek for new equilibrium by shifting its alliance, risking the Indian interest. For Bhutan, the current trend is, if one bunch of Bhutanese politicians leans towards India, another is bound to lean towards China given the fragility of Sino- Indian relations.

The Security Landscape of the Region

The paradox about China and Bhutan is that though Bhutan has a long tradition of cultural and religious interaction with Tibet and shares a common border with China, yet the kingdom is the only neighbour which does not have diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. However, the status quo in the relationship did change after the PRC’s full annexation of Tibet, known as the Sino-Tibet 1959 issue and the Sino-Indian border conflict, 1962. China views its relationship with Bhutan as part of its “Western development strategy,” which would enable Tibet to reclaim a central role in the Himalayan area, while Bhutan wishes to be cautious to preserve a diplomatic approach in the China- Bhutan-India triangle.27 Through the signs of further détente in the region, the perspectives of normalisation of Bhutan-China relations will open a new aspect in Himalayan politics. This might be of concern for India. The reality of Bhutan’s position and shared borders with India means that destabilising elements from

26 Cannon, Brendon J. “Geopolitics in the Himalayas: China’s Strategy, and What “Rimland” States

like India Can Do About It’.” Mapping China’s Himalayan Hustle (2024): 235-240.

27 Mathou, Thierry. Bhutan-China relations: Towards a new step in Himalayan politics. Centre for

Bhutan Studies, 2004.

external sources will continue to pose threats to its stability. This was evident from the spillover effects of militancy from Assam, and of cross-border economic migration driven by regional poverty, when once again India needs to be cautious, prudent, and realistic. According to Bhutan, it is under increasing pressure to start diplomatic relations with China and resolve the border dispute. PRC began to form a ‘Himalayan federation’ comprising of Tibet, Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the North-East Frontier Agency of India to extend its influence in southern Himalayas. In 1958, it occupied about 300 square miles of Bhutanese territory in northern and northeastern Bhutan. Following a Chinese incursion into Bhutanese territory in September 1979, the Royal government decided to normalise relations with China, and direct Sino-Bhutan annual border talks started alternately in Thimphu and Beijing, an issue which had been a part of Sino-Indian border discussions. China always maintains that Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 is an ‘unequal’ treaty, a symbol of India’s hegemony in the region.28 In December 1998, the signing of an interim agreement to normalise peace and tranquillity along the Sino-Bhutan border itself was evidence of China recognising Bhutan’s sovereignty. China proposed to exchange 495 square kilometre area Pasamlung and Jarkarlung valleys in the northern borders with 269 square kilometer area Sinchulumba, Dramana, and Shakhtoe in the north- west Bhutan. Actually, Sinchulumba is very near to the Chumbi Valley and shares a border with Sikkim.29 This territorial swapping would have seriously undermined India’s security by shifting the Sino-Bhutan border to the south. After the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962, the royal rulers became extremely suspicious and cautious about Chinese susceptibilities and were disinclined to provoke China by affirming special relations with India. The third King of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, regarded the 1949 treaty as anachronistic in the changed circumstances and sought to revise it. The balance of power in the region has changed mainly because of China’s rise to power. They subverted the special relationship with India and proved their allegiance to China by finally replacing Article 2 of the 1949 treaty. Moreover, India’s northeast insurgents like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the

28 Das, Jyoti P. “The Tri-Junction Tussle.” The Geopolitics. (2023).

29 Mitra, Debamitra. “‘Yam between Two Boulders: Re-Assessing India–Bhutan

Relationship.” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (2013): 185-203.

National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and Kamtapur Liberation Army (KLA) having their hideouts and training ground in Bhutanese soil created concern for Bhutan from the Indian side, Bhutan felt security threat from its most trusted ally in the south.30 According to the Royal government, the militants from Assam and West Bengal have the potential to undermine the friendship not only between two countries, but also between people living along the borders. They have hampered business and internally have prevented implementation of developmental activities in Bhutan.31 Bhutan always felt that the greatest threat for her was from the northern borders in different dimensions, be it suzerainty claims, cartographic invasion, territorial intrusion, or enclave occupation. While with its limited security forces it guarded the northern borders, its southern front was comparatively peaceful. The Royal government feels that Indo-Bhutan friendship had guaranteed it. Resorting to safeguard measures, the government faced dilemma. First, acquiescing to India’s unilateral military operation would tantamount to violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bhutan. Second, military action from the Bhutanese end would incite the local Indian population living in the border towns against the Bhutanese population. Moreover, Bhutanese travellers using the Indian highways to travel from west to east would face risks, should there be any military action.32 Nevertheless, the security forces were compelled to fight out the insurgents in 2003 from the Bhutanese soil. The long period of peace and calm that the current Bhutanese generation has proudly inherited can no longer be taken for granted, as the operations ramifications have revealed. India cannot force Bhutan not to cut its losses and follow up the guiding principles on which Bhutan and China agreed in the 1988 and 1998 agreements on maintaining peace and tranquillity in border areas with full-fledged border settlement. Bhutan cannot forever be hidden in India’s backyard. Every action the kingdom has taken has been done so with great caution and attention to avoid any upsetting India. Geopolitically, the Himalayan country not only acts as a cushion for Indian security in northern frontiers but also offers economic benefits inherent in cross-

30 Majumdar, Munmun. “India–Myanmar border fencing and India’s act east policy.” India

Quarterly 76, no. 1 (2020): 58-72.

31 Majumdar, Anindya Jyoti. “India and China in South Asia: Towards trans-regional politics.”

In South Asia and China, pp. 97-110. Routledge India, 2021.

32 Penjore, Dorji. “Security of Bhutan: Walking between the giants.” (2004).

border commerce, trade, and counterterrorism in the northeast corridor; all of these necessitate an improved relationship between the two countries. The potential and positive implications of these issues justify the re-assessment of Indo-Bhutan ‘beneficial bilateralism’ on a higher plane of realism.33

India-Bhutan Co-operation

Mutual warmth and friendliness characterise India-Bhutan relations, which are reinforced by frequent high-level interactions and visits between the two. Since both countries have developed strong cultural, historical, geographical, social, and economic ties and formalised their relationship by signing the “Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship” in August 1949, this bond has become increasingly important after the independence of India from Britishers.34 India’s successive governments have continuously placed a high value on this relationship and made substantial investments in it. According to India’s “Neighbourhood First Policy” (NFP), Bhutan is very important. This policy places a strong focus on collaboration based on the non-reciprocity principle and the unique needs and demands of its neighbouring nations.35 India has made several high-level trips to Bhutan during the last ten years, which has improved the two countries bilateral relations. The most notable trip occurred in June 2014 when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi presented the foundation stone for the 600 MW Kholongchu Hydropower Project, which is a joint venture between Bhutanese and Indian public sector companies Druk Green Power Cooperation and SJVNL. To better assist Bhutanese students, the Nehru-Wangchuck Scholarship was doubled to ₹20 million annually during the visit, and Bhutan’s new Supreme Court building, a project funded by India, was inaugurated. During his visit to Bhutan in November 2014, the then-Indian President Pranab Mukherjee introduced a number of significant projects, such as the East-West Highway double-lining project, the Yelchen Central School,

33 Ghising, Aditya Kant. The Chicken’s Neck: A Geopolitical Anatomy of India’s Siliguri Corridor.

Routledge, 2025.

34 Government of India. “Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship.” Ministry of External Affairs,

Government of India. n.d. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5242/ treaty+or+perpetual+p

35 Bharati, Subodh C & Mahawar Nutan Kapoor. “Exploring India-Bhutan Relations A deep dive

into the Neighbourhood First Policy.” Indian Council of World Affairs (2025)

and the School Reform Program.36 India’s unwavering support for Bhutan’s educational and infrastructure development was evident in these projects. The significance of Bhutan in India’s NFP is highlighted by these trips, which also serve to strengthen the two countries’ close diplomatic and economic connections and demonstrate a sustained commitment to cooperation, mutual development, and support. Modi’s 2019 visit to Bhutan was focused on technological developments and energy cooperation. He formally inaugurated the 720 MW Mangdechhu Hydroelectric Plant and introduced the use of Indian RuPay cards in Bhutan. During his visit, other announcements were also made, such as an increase in the quantity of subsidised LPG and a new power purchase agreement for the Mangdechhu hydroelectric project.37 Additionally, other Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were signed pertaining to information technology, education, academic exchanges, aviation, and cooperation in legal and judicial education. Bilateral cooperation in fields like education and space technology was greatly enhanced by this visit. Modi’s visits demonstrated India’s ongoing dedication to regional cooperation and Bhutan’s socioeconomic growth. Notably, all parties decided to build train connections between Bhutan and India, which is a big step in the direction of improving connectivity. Two distinct routes, Kokrajhar-Gelephu and Banarhat-Samtse, as well as their implementation procedures, are outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) pertaining to these train connections.38 Even the Bhutan’s high-level visits to India have also contributed significantly to the development of bilateral ties. When Bhutanese King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck visited India in January 2014, the two nations reaffirmed their mutual support and close historical connections. During the visit, the King expressed gratitude for India’s ongoing support of Bhutan’s socioeconomic growth. When Bhutanese Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay visited India in January 2015, both countries reaffirmed their commitment to the ambitious 10,000 MW project and expressed satisfaction with the status

36 Government of India. “India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty.” Ministry of External Affairs,

Government of India (2007).

37 Government of India. “Joint Press Statement on the State Visit of Prime Minister of India to the

Kingdom of Bhutan (15-16 June 2014).” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

38 Mitra, Debamitra. “‘Yam between Two Boulders: Re-Assessing India–Bhutan

Relationship.” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (2013): 185-203.

of existing hydropower developments. Prime Minister Tobgay visited the sacred locations of Bodhgaya and Varanasi. This emphasises even more the deep cultural ties between the two countries. Prime Minister Tobgay reaffirmed India’s commitment to Bhutan’s socioeconomic growth and its ongoing support for the nation’s Five-Year Plans during his following visit to India in July 2018.39 Both countries celebrated the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic ties and emphasised the value of hydroelectric cooperation. Another noteworthy visit occurred in December 2018 when Lotay Tshering, the prime minister of Bhutan, travelled to India to discuss strengthening commercial relations and advancing the 10,000 MW hydropower project. Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay’s visit to India in March 2024 highlighted continued collaboration in the energy industry, particularly the accomplishment of the Punatshangchhu-II hydroelectric project.40 In addition to strengthening connections in space technology, the formal sessions during the visit continued to centre on increasing cooperation in solar, wind, and green energy efforts. A Memorandum of Understanding for the GyalSung National Service Program, which focuses on developing young Bhutanese leaders, was signed at the end of the tour.41 The Bhutanese King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck’s visit in December 2024 signalled further advancements in strategic alliances, especially in the areas of clean energy cooperation, the Punatshangchhu-II project, and the integration of economic activity along the border between India and Bhutan. Additionally, from February

20 to 21, 2025, Bhutanese Prime Minister Dasho Tshering Tobgay travelled to

New Delhi to attend the School of Ultimate Leadership’s inaugural Leadership Conclave. Over the past 12 years, both Indian and Bhutanese leaders have made numerous bilateral high-level trips that have highlighted their warmth and mutual trust and further strengthened their complex connection.42

39 Government of India. “Joint Statement on the State Visit of Prime Minister of India to Bhutan.”

Ministry of External affairs, Government of India (August 18, 2019).

40 Government of India. “List of Outcomes: State visit of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to

Bhutan.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (March 22, 2024).

41 Government of India. “List of Outcomes: State visit of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to

Bhutan.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (March 22, 2024).

42 Royal Government of Bhutan. “Official visit of H.E. Dasho Tshering Tobgay, Hon’ble Prime

Minister, to India, July 5 – 7, 2018.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, Royal Government of Bhutan (July 08, 2018).

Trade and Transit between India and Bhutan

India’s West Bengal and Bhutan’s border traverses through Nagrahata to Jaigaon to Kumargram. Similarly, Bhutan’s border with Assam passes through the towns of Kumargram, Dadgari, Darangamela, and Udalguri. These towns of India, spaced within 15 kilometres of Bhutan, Assam, and West Bengal borders are entirely dependent on Bhutan for livelihood. For example, every day, over 17,000 Indians from Jaigaon travel to Phuntsholing to work as electricians, plumbers, technicians, accountants, managers, and instructors. Similarly, almost 40,000 Indians living between Nagrakata and Udalguri earn their living unhindered from Bhutan.43 Bhutanese currency, Ngultrum (Nu) is freely used not only in these border towns but in the inner areas situated beyond 15 kilometre of Bhutan–Assam–West Bengal border, in the towns like Hasimara, Madarihat, Banarhat, Alipore, Cooch Behar, Bongaigaon, and Dhupgiri in Assam. It proves the influence of Bhutan on the local economies of India. Along with geography, the conditions of peace, stability, honesty, security, and positive attitude among the communities of the two countries in the border region have made such economic churn happen, which is most unlikely to be found in the borders of India-Nepal or India-Bangladesh. Moreover, in the weekly market in Assam on every Thursday in Gelephu-Dadgari town, almost 10,000 Bhutanese come down from the districts of Sarpang, Tsirang, Dagana, Zhemgang, Pemagatshel, Samdrup Jongkhkhar, Mongar, and Trashigang. Indians gains in lakhs from the weekly market. As an informal practice, a wide range of businesses is undertaken by Indians using the licenses of Bhutanese nationals. These businesses span from small shops trading in petty consumer items to small and medium-scale businesses such as construction. The border town of Phuentsholing is the centre of commercial hub in the country, the gateway of exit and entry of goods as well as travellers. The Indian town Jaigoan is ‘just across the fence’ where tailor-made food and other essentials suited to Bhutanese needs are especially sold. About 2,000 Bhutanese live in Jaigaon, India. Business community in Jaigoan and Phuntsholing has prospered largely owing to the level of trading activities between them and their customers. Hence, the economic viability of India-Bhutan cross-border trade convinces Bhutan’s importance for India as well.

43 Mitra, Debamitra. “‘Yam between Two Boulders: Re-Assessing India–Bhutan

Relationship.” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (2013): 185-203.

Jaigaon-Phuentsholing border link through North Bengal is the most important road link between India and Bhutan. More than 90 percent trade is being carried out through this point.44 The reasons are several: historical connectivity, geographical proximity, road route facilities, proximity to seaports in Kolkata and Haldia, proximity to a large business centre like Siliguri, connectivity to other parts of India through highway links via Siliguri and Kolkata, long-established customs offices, and other documentation facilities. In comparison, north-eastern entry points to Bhutan like Gelephu or Samdrup Jonghkher have not only been made remote but also less used and are less convenient for large-scale trade and commerce. The route, traversing through Phuntsoling–Coochbehar–Changrabandha (Bangladesh)–Siliguri–Kakarbita (Nepal), is doing well as desired; nothing is happening in the Northeast front between Assam and Bhutan.45 Logistically, this route is more economical than the North Bengal route because commodities must be unloaded in Phuntsoling until further dispatched to east Bhutan or to Thimphu. Trade routes in at least twelve of twenty districts of Bhutan must pass through Indian state of Assam. Samdrup Jonghkar–Gelephu–Guwahati–Dawki should have been as potential and busy as the north Bengal route. Truckers are unwilling to take the Assam route due to militant problems. Instead of Bhutan, the northeast seems to be more landlocked. Even if the facilities are there in Dawki, which the Government of India has provided, the outcome is absolutely zero, except by air on average; in 365 days, bandhs are held for 113 days. It is giving rise to corruption, mainly bribery, so much so that for a stretch of 40 km, the bribery is around Rs 700/-. While in a month on average, 170 trucks ply through the north Bengal route, only around 50 trucks can take the Assam Road link. According to the Consulate office in Kolkata tourism between Bhutan and India is also not picking up through the Assam link because of insurgency making West Bengal become the best beneficiary of it. The eastern part of Bhutan producing vegetables and fruits has a favourable market in the north-east of India and in the countries of Myanmar and Bangladesh. In addition, Bhutan has mineral reserves like

44 Kharat, Rajesh S., and Chunku Bhutia. “Changing Dynamics of India–Bhutan Relations.”

In India in South Asia: Challenges and Management, pp. 35-55. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2019.

45 Mitra, Debamitra. “‘Yam between Two Boulders: Re-Assessing India–Bhutan

Relationship.” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (2013): 185-203.

limestone, gypsum, coal, close to the borders with Assam. Hence, developments in the north-east will enhance the scope of trade through the corridor. According to the Consulate General, Bhutan had taken concrete steps to stop public support for the militants in the Assam–Bhutan border, helping the Assamese in bordering villages with employment, electricity, and free irrigation services. Through people-to-people diplomacy and providing means of earnings, they are persuading them not to anchor on militancy. In Gelephu, for example, about 700 Assamese come to Bhutan as day-workers with a minimum earning of Rs 100/- per day. The tribal communities like Bodos, Santhals, Kacharis, Rajbanshis staying near the border areas are taking this opportunity.46 Both nations have institutionalised cooperation through regular high- level dialogues, joint military training, particularly to counter external threats such as Chinese territorial assertions and cross-border infiltration. The Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) stationed in Bhutan plays a pivotal role in capacity-building for the Royal Bhutan Army, while bilateral agreements ensure coordinated border management and infrastructure development along sensitive frontier regions. Additionally, India supports Bhutan’s socio-economic development through aid and investment, which indirectly strengthens its resilience against external influence. But contention remains that India is yet to take a very stable stand in combating insurgency and making the northeast corridor a viable alternative for trade; not only between Bhutan and India, but also other countries adjacent to the region.

Conclusion

There are two competing regional powers in the Himalayan region, which are not partners to one other, thus creating a difficult atmosphere for its small neighbours like Nepal, Bhutan. This geostrategic location makes Bhutan so important in big neighbours’ perception of security. Bhutan was the focus of big power politics Tibetans and Mongols from north, and the British India from the south. Today they are replaced by China and India. Bhutan claims that though its relation with China is not as lively as with India, however, the global shift in the regional and international relations mostly brought about by forces of globalization is changing this edifice. China’s aspiration to become a world power will undoubtedly seek to enhance and maintain military power consistent

46 Mitra, Debamitra. “‘Yam between Two Boulders: Re-Assessing India–Bhutan

Relationship.” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (2013): 185-203.

with such a position. It might either deter or cajole smaller neighbours and try to dissuade more powerful rivals. Its proclaimed national security strategy might encompass factors like safeguarding a security environment favourable to the country’s economic construction and the country’s territorial integrity. It will pay utmost attention to establishing good-neighbourhood relations with surrounding countries and developing bilateral security cooperation. These security strategies will invariably have an impact on the competitive relationship between India and China. The long friendship between India and Bhutan should not be taken for granted. India’s support for Bhutan does not necessarily mean that Bhutan will be perpetually dependent on India. From India’s end, the importance of safety in the northeast corridor; India’s security concern in the north and Bhutan’s exposure to the world since 1990 need to be assessed in its bilateral relationship on a realistic paradigm. Indian foreign policy should recognise Bhutan’s strategic significance, local economic viability, trade potential, counterterrorism needs, and the new balance of power created by China’s bid to become the leading military and economic force in the Asia-Pacific. Bhutan being within India’s security interests, whatever follows in Indo-China relations will bear implications for Indo-Bhutan relations, as well. And even as current geopolitical and geo-economic realities ensure that India will continue to be one of the most important neighbours in Bhutan’s foreign relations, Bhutan cannot ignore the reality of China to its north. Moreover, growing Chinese interests in South Asia encompass Bhutan as well. The annual border talks and several interactions between Bhutan and China are creating a favourable context that can turn into a complete normalisation of relations as soon as the regional condition allows it. In such a situation, the pressure will be high on India to adopt a less defensive attitude towards its border relations with China.

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