GEOPOLITICS OF THE EASTERN HIMALAYAS: INDIA–BHUTAN SECURITY CONCERNS AND THEIR COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

Authors: Dr. Saurabh Sharma & Geetasri Boruah

Publisher: Research Centre for Eastern and North Eastern Regional Studies, Kolkata (CENERS-K)

ABSTRACT

Bhutan’s unique geographical location between two major rising powers of Asia with opposite political ideologies in the 21st century offers it an extremely crucial geopolitical position. Historically, Bhutan has balanced its relations between India and Tibet, but in recent times it has been closer to India for the last five to six decades. The geopolitical shift in the Himalayan region closely influences India–Bhutan bilateral relations. China’s rising assertiveness, cross-border territorial disputes, and expanding regional ambitions have introduced new complexities to security concerns in the region. India and Bhutan, bound by deep historical, strategic, and cultural ties, have adapted their security collaboration to meet emerging challenges ranging from border tensions to infrastructure competition. The paper examines how traditional and non-traditional security threats are transforming in the Himalayan region, impacting India–Bhutan relations. It further probes the strategic measures that need to be collectively taken to combat the emerging threats.

Keywords: Border disputes, China, Governance, Region, Threat

INTRODUCTION

Geopolitical analysis provides crucial insights into a nation’s position among its neighbours, revealing how geography and political dynamics shape national behaviour, intra-regional relations, and foreign policy directions. Geopolitics entails the interplay of terrain with politics—an art of statecraft thriving on geographical features like position, climate, geomorphology, and resources. In the period of globalisation, classical geopolitical imagination has always focused on ‘securing’ its home. A country’s security and development are greatly impacted by the way its boundaries are drawn, which is influenced by both natural and political factors. As seen in events like the Doklam standoff, which underscore the region’s ongoing security concerns, Bhutan’s high-altitude frontiers are strategically significant as a geopolitical buffer zone. [1]

The Eastern Himalayas form a geopolitically sensitive arc, spanning India, Bhutan, Nepal, the Tibet Autonomous Region, and Myanmar. The rugged mountain passes, deep river valleys, and high-altitude plateaus—covering nearly 65 percent of the terrain within India and Bhutan—create an extreme topography of peaks over 7,000 meters, snow, and monsoons that serve as natural defensive barriers while exposing vulnerabilities via narrow passes and riverine corridors. [2] The Eastern Himalayas are a vital zone of connectivity, ecology, and human development, where stable borders underpin trade, hydropower cooperation, and infrastructure projects central to India’s Act East Policy and Bhutan’s development model. [3] To prevent the ecological consequences of militarisation and to safeguard populations downstream, the delicate Himalayan ecosystem, rich in biodiversity and water supplies, requires a low-tension political climate. [4] Borderland communities along the India–Bhutan frontier embody this human dimension: their livelihoods, cultural exchanges, and everyday mobility depend on predictable, peaceful cross-border interactions, making them both beneficiaries and informal custodians of stability. [5]

A strategically important yet often uncredited role in the contemporary development of Sino-Indian relations and the broader spatial and geopolitical dynamics in the region rests with the Kingdom of Bhutan. Bhutan is landlocked in the Eastern Himalayas between China and India, and remains one of the few countries in Asia to never have experienced colonisation. Due to its geographical position in the Himalayas, Bhutan—also known as Druk Yul, meaning the Dragon Kingdom—has historically maintained a policy of self-isolation that limited the influx as well as the exodus of goods, ideas, and people. India and Bhutan share long historical ties, whereas there were no direct formal diplomatic relations between Bhutan and China; historically, they communicated through Tibet. Because China was not a direct neighbour to Bhutan prior to the mid-20th century, Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, served as their common interaction route. Following China’s annexation of Tibet in 1951, Bhutan became a direct neighbour of China without much choice, and since then, the Bhutanese have remained wary of China’s policies. [6] For India–Bhutan border security, this terrain’s strategic centrality revolves around the Doklam Plateau, the Chumbi Valley, and the Siliguri Corridor, which links mainland India to the Northeast—positioning Bhutan’s highlands as a vital buffer offering strategic depth, early warning, and lateral mobility against threats like China’s moves in the Chumbi Valley, as starkly revealed in the 2017 Doklam standoff. [7]

Since the 1970s, Bhutan gradually started opening its external engagements, forging deeper and more trusted ties with India than with China. Bhutan has not remained insulated from the larger geopolitical developments in the Himalayan region. Owing to its geographical position, economic developments within Bhutan continued to be heavily connected to its bilateral relations with India. Bhutan’s national security and foreign policy have been closely tied to India following the Partition of British India in 1947, formalized via the 1949 Friendship Treaty. The Friendship Treaty was revised in 2007, modifying the provision requiring Bhutan to take guidance from India in foreign affairs. Concurrently, Bhutan transitioned from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy, which enhanced Bhutan’s sovereign agency in its foreign affairs. Meanwhile, China remains intent upon gaining control of the Himalayan region. [8] Most prominent are its mega-infrastructure systems, such as roads and border outposts, developed with Chinese backing to expand its strategic footprint relative to India. Beijing has pushed to strengthen its ties across South Asia and constructed significant military and dual-use structures near the border. China’s relentless drive is not just about gaining the high ground, but about reshaping the balance of power, isolating India, and achieving strategic ascendance in the region.

THE HISTORY OF THE EASTERN HIMALAYAS

The Himalayas form a well-discernible natural barrier separating the Tibetan plateau and the Indian plains. The majority of the pre-colonial Eastern Himalayan principalities were conquered during the 1770s by the Gorkhali army, substantially extending the domain of the Gorkha Kingdom. This expansionist Gorkhali army was eventually checked by Tibet in the north and by the British in the south. The Treaty of Sugauli was signed in 1816, forcing the Gorkhas to cede their annexed territories to the British.

During the early seventeenth century, many Drukpa Lamas from Tibet came as politico-religious exiles to the Eastern Himalayas in parts of Sikkim and Bhutan. Since the state of Sikkim and the Kingdom of Bhutan identified themselves as ‘Drukpa’ states, Tibetan influence in the Eastern Himalayas became more conspicuous as Tibetan Lamas preached Buddhism. From the early and mid-seventeenth century onwards, Bhutias (of Tibetan ancestry) settled in Sikkim, followed later by the Nepalese. On the other hand, an ethnic group named the Sharchops are regarded as the earliest inhabitants of eastern Bhutan, while the Ngalop and Kheng groups alongside them constituted the core of Bhutanese Drukpa identity. [9]

The British signed the Treaty of Sinchula with Bhutan in 1865, forcing Bhutan to cede territory in the south and east known as the Duars. The British also assumed considerable influence over Bhutan in matters relating to external affairs through the Sinchula Treaty. The British had multifarious geopolitical intentions over the Eastern Himalayas, ranging from developing the hills for a plantation economy and transforming the region into a recruitment base for the British army, to diminishing Tibetan and Chinese influence in the Eastern Himalayas. Foremost among the geo-economic ambitions of the British towards the Eastern Himalayas was tea cultivation, as its climate was conducive to producing the finest varieties of tea. The commercial imperative over the Eastern Himalayas was also tied to the 19th-century trade route—the Royal Road to Lhasa—passing through Sikkim. The route through the Chumbi Valley was the shortest path from India to Tibet. [10] This route became geopolitically vital to the British after the older trade route to Tibet passing through Nepal became dysfunctional following the Gorkha upheavals in the late 18th century. The British also encouraged Nepalese migration into the Eastern Himalayas. Historically, the Lepchas were considered the earliest settlers in Sikkim, followed by the Bhutias and the Nepalese.

By the end of the 19th century, in order to guard the Indian borders from Chinese and Tibetan incursions, the British negotiated the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 “to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters related to the border between Tibet and Sikkim.” Post-independence, the Indo-Bhutan Treaty (1949) and the Indo-Sikkim Treaty (1950) were negotiated to establish independent India’s security framework with these Himalayan states. [11] The Indo-Nepal Treaty (1950) established an open border regime, facilitating significant cross-border movement in the Eastern Himalayas. Following India’s independence in 1947, New Delhi entered into a Standstill Agreement before upholding Bhutan’s sovereignty and signing the new Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship in 1949. Signed in the wake of growing instability and Chinese assertions in Tibet and the Eastern Himalayas, the treaty stipulated that Bhutan would be guided by India in matters of defence and external affairs, while encouraging free movement of people, bilateral trade, and commerce, as well as reciprocal rights for citizens in each other’s country. [12]

BHUTAN’S SIGNIFICANCE BETWEEN THE TWO GIANTS

The Himalayas function as a formidable physical barrier: steep ridgelines and low-oxygen altitudes deter mass incursions by channelling movement into narrow passes, while southern foothills and valleys facilitate trade and patrols, necessitating integrated border management. [13] Nehru’s dictum that “geography has been the most important factor in our history” aptly frames how such obstacles are transformed into strategic assets through infrastructure initiatives like Project DANTAK. Bhutan’s connective role between India and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region aligns with Mackinder’s Heartland and Rimland concepts, positioning the Eastern Himalayas as a strategic hinge of geography, population, and water resources. [14]

Historically, Bhutan’s location has served as a buffer for India’s fragile Siliguri Corridor, shielding the Indo-Gangetic heartland from potential northern thrusts and reducing the risk of Chinese strategic incursions toward the Bay of Bengal. [15] At the same time, Bhutan’s position in this rimland zone has embedded India’s security role within a cooperative framework rather than direct territorial control; treaty-based responsibilities foster institutionalised collaboration. [16] British frontier policies first consolidated this buffer arrangement, which was later formalised by the 1949 India–Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, granting India a consultative role in Bhutan’s external affairs while preserving Bhutanese sovereignty. [17] The 2007 revision of the treaty signalled a modern recalibration wherein Bhutan asserted greater sovereign agency while reaffirming deep security and economic cooperation with India.

China’s growing assertiveness along Bhutan’s borders and the 2017 Doklam standoff translated these structural vulnerabilities into concrete security crises, demonstrating how terrain and geopolitics intersect in the Himalayas. [18] Doklam, located near the tri-junction of India, Bhutan, and China, sits on a strategic ridge overlooking approaches to the Siliguri Corridor; any consolidation of Chinese presence there would shorten military response times, improve surveillance over Indian territory, and potentially outflank Indian defences, making Bhutan’s territorial integrity indispensable to India’s security calculus. [19] For Bhutan, the episode underscored that cooperation with India provides both a security umbrella against external pressure and diplomatic space to preserve its sovereignty amid sharpening great-power rivalry. [20] The Doklam crisis also highlighted that the region cannot be understood solely through a militarised lens.

In 2020, Beijing and New Delhi accused each other of altering the territorial status quo in the Western Himalayas, as violent clashes between Chinese and Indian security forces in the Galwan Valley and the ensuing interstate tensions dominated international headlines. [21] The series of incidents culminated in an increased military build-up along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and economic countermeasures by India, bringing the bilateral relationship to its lowest point since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. [22] Ongoing border disputes between the two nuclear-armed neighbours, India’s opposition to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and growing maritime competition in the Indian Ocean render the Sino-Indian border regions in the Eastern and Western Himalayas a zone of persistent strategic friction. China’s strategy in the Himalayas combines economic statecraft and infrastructure development to press its territorial claims, backed by military posture to secure control of the tactical high ground. [23]

The Doklam plateau, located at the tri-junction of China, India, and Bhutan, remains a central geopolitical flashpoint in the Eastern Himalayas. The Doklam area has long been used as a traditional grazing ground by Bhutanese herders. While China has repeatedly challenged Bhutan’s sovereignty over Doklam—perceiving the plateau as strategically vital to expanding the depth of the Chumbi Valley—Beijing accused India of crossing into disputed territory during the 2017 standoff, citing its own interpretation of the 1890 Anglo-Chinese Convention. China’s infrastructure push in the region seeks to extend connectivity southward toward the Nathu La pass and the Chumbi Valley. [24] This directly threatens the Siliguri Corridor (or ‘Chicken’s Neck’), a narrow ~27-km-wide stretch created after the Partition of Bengal that connects Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim, the Darjeeling hills, and all of Northeast India with the rest of India. [25]

Map Reference: The Doklam Tri-Junction

Source: BBC News (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40478813)

Caption: The map illustrates the Nathu La Pass on the left and the Doklam Plateau on the right at the India–Bhutan–China tri-junction—a critical geopolitical location for India, as the Siliguri Corridor lies less than 150 km south of the plateau.

(Note: Insert original map image from journal here if needed)

In the geopolitical calculus of the Indian state, any political or military instability along its Himalayan borders directly impacts its national security. China’s military build-up and infrastructure construction along its disputed borders in the Himalayas—evidenced by the 2017 Doklam standoff, the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, and persistent claims over Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin—demonstrate Beijing’s attempts to unilaterally alter the status quo. [26] Such moves aim to undermine India’s strategic depth and tip the regional balance of power in China’s favour. At the same time, New Delhi must remain attentive to domestic perspectives within Bhutan, ensuring that bilateral relations remain responsive to Bhutan’s evolving priorities so that Thimphu’s delicate balancing act between its two giant neighbours does not compromise core Indian and Bhutanese security interests.

THE SECURITY LANDSCAPE OF THE REGION

A notable paradox regarding China and Bhutan is that although Bhutan shares a long history of cultural and religious interaction with Tibet and a contiguous border with China, the kingdom is the only sovereign neighbour of China that does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, the regional security environment changed permanently after the PRC’s annexation of Tibet, the 1959 Tibetan uprising, and the 1962 Sino-Indian War. China views its engagement with Bhutan as part of its broader Western Development Strategy to consolidate Tibet’s position in the Himalayan arc, whereas Bhutan exercises caution to preserve its diplomatic equilibrium within the China–Bhutan–India triangle. [27] Any potential normalisation of Bhutan–China relations or boundary settlement carries significant strategic implications for Himalayan politics and Indian security. Furthermore, the reality of Bhutan’s shared open border with India means that non-traditional and sub-conventional threats—such as the historical spillover of militancy from Assam and cross-border economic pressures—require continuous vigilance, prudence, and realism from both New Delhi and Thimphu.

Over the decades, Bhutan has faced persistent Chinese pressure to establish formal diplomatic relations and resolve their boundary dispute bilaterally. Early PRC rhetoric in the 1950s referenced a ‘Himalayan federation’ encompassing Tibet, Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh). In 1958, Chinese maps claimed approximately 300 square miles of territory in northern and northeastern Bhutan. Following Chinese incursions into Bhutanese territory in September 1979, the Royal Government of Bhutan initiated direct bilateral boundary talks with China in 1984, held alternately in Thimphu and Beijing—an issue that had previously been addressed within the broader Sino-Indian framework. Beijing has frequently portrayed the 1949 Indo-Bhutan Treaty as a relic of Indian hegemony in the region. [28]

In December 1998, Bhutan and China signed an interim Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity in the Bhutan–China Border Areas, marking Beijing’s first formal written acknowledgement of Bhutan’s sovereignty. Previously, in the 1990s, China had proposed a “package deal” offering to relinquish its claims to a 495 sq. km area in the Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys in northern Bhutan in exchange for a 269 sq. km area comprising Sinchulungpa, Dramana, and Shakhatoe in northwestern Bhutan. Crucially, the northwestern sector lies adjacent to the Chumbi Valley and shares a border with Sikkim. [29] Accepting such a territorial swap would seriously undermine India’s security by shifting the Sino-Bhutan border southward toward the Siliguri Corridor.

Following the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Bhutanese monarchs remained careful not to unnecessarily provoke China while maintaining their close security partnership with India. The third King of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, gradually modernised Bhutan’s external posture, culminating decades later in the 2007 revision of Article 2 of the 1949 treaty to reflect mutual consultation rather than guidance.

Additionally, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, Indian insurgent groups from the Northeast—specifically the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO)—established clandestine camps and hideouts in the dense jungles of southern Bhutan, creating a severe security crisis for the kingdom. [30] According to the Royal Government, the presence of armed militants from Assam and northern West Bengal threatened not only bilateral relations and cross-border harmony, but also disrupted commerce and halted developmental activities inside southern Bhutan. [31]

While Bhutan had historically viewed its primary external security challenges as emanating from its northern border—whether through cartographic aggression, territorial intrusions, or grazing disputes—the insurgent camps created an acute dilemma on its southern frontier. First, requesting unilateral Indian military intervention on Bhutanese soil would compromise Bhutan’s sovereignty and domestic standing. Second, launching military action itself carried the risk of retaliation by militant groups against Bhutanese citizens and traders using Indian highways in Assam and West Bengal to travel between western and eastern Bhutan. [32]

Ultimately, after peaceful negotiations failed to convince the militants to depart, the Royal Bhutan Army—led personally by the Fourth King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck—launched Operation All Clear in December 2003, successfully flushing out the insurgent camps from Bhutanese soil with logistical support from the Indian armed forces. The operation demonstrated both the fragility of regional peace and the depth of India–Bhutan security cooperation. Geopolitically, Bhutan not only acts as a vital buffer for Indian security along its northern frontiers, but also serves as an essential partner in cross-border commerce, regional connectivity, and counter-insurgency in the Northeast corridor—all of which justify strengthening Indo-Bhutan ‘beneficial bilateralism’ on a foundation of strategic realism. [33]

INDIA–BHUTAN COOPERATION

Mutual warmth, trust, and friendship characterise India–Bhutan relations, reinforced by frequent high-level interactions and state visits. Grounded in deep cultural, historical, geographical, social, and economic ties, and formalised through the Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship in August 1949 (and its 2007 revision), this partnership has grown steadily stronger since Indian independence. [34] Successive Indian governments have consistently prioritised this relationship. Under India’s “Neighbourhood First Policy” (NFP), Bhutan occupies a special place, emphasising collaborative development based on non-reciprocity and responsiveness to the priorities of partner nations. [35]

Key High-Level Visits and Bilateral Milestones (2014–2025)

June 2014 (PM Narendra Modi’s First Foreign Visit): Prime Minister Narendra Modi chose Bhutan for his first overseas state visit, laying the foundation stone for the 600 MW Kholongchhu Hydropower Project (a joint venture between Druk Green Power Corporation and SJVNL). During the visit, the Nehru–Wangchuck Scholarship was doubled to ₹20 million annually, and Bhutan’s new Supreme Court building—funded by India—was inaugurated.
November 2014 (President Pranab Mukherjee’s State Visit): Indian President Pranab Mukherjee launched several key initiatives, including the East–West Highway double-laning project, the Yelchen Central School, and support for the School Reform Program, underscoring India’s commitment to Bhutan’s educational and infrastructure development. [36, 37]
2015 & 2018 Visits (Golden Jubilee of Diplomatic Relations): During visits by King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck (2014) and Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay (January 2015 and July 2018), both countries reviewed progress toward the ambitious 10,000 MW hydropower cooperation target and celebrated the 50th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations in 2018. In December 2018, Prime Minister Lotay Tshering visited India, securing substantial Indian support for Bhutan’s 12th Five-Year Plan.
August 2019 (PM Modi’s Second State Visit): Focused on technology, space, and energy cooperation. PM Modi formally inaugurated the 720 MW Mangdechhu Hydroelectric Plant, launched Indian RuPay cards in Bhutan, inaugurated the ground earth station for the South Asia Satellite in Thimphu, and signed multiple MoUs across IT, education, aviation, and judicial exchange.
Cross-Border Rail Connectivity: Both nations agreed to establish the first-ever cross-border railway links between India and Bhutan across two routes—Kokrajhar–Gelephu (Assam to Sarpang) and Banarhat–Samtse (West Bengal to Samtse)—marking a major milestone in regional connectivity. [38, 39]
March 2024 Visits (Reciprocal Visits by PM Tobgay & PM Modi): Highlighted continued collaboration in the energy sector, notably the nears-completion of the 1,020 MW Punatshangchhu-II Hydroelectric Project, alongside expanded cooperation in solar, wind, and green energy, space technology, and an MoU supporting Bhutan’s Gyalsung National Service Program for youth leadership development. [40, 41]
December 2024 & February 2025 Visits: King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck’s visit to India in December 2024 advanced strategic cooperation in clean energy, the commissioning of the Punatshangchhu-II project, and cross-border economic integration (including support for the Gelephu Mindfulness City project). Subsequently, from February 20 to 21, 2025, Prime Minister Dasho Tshering Tobgay visited New Delhi to attend the inaugural Leadership Conclave of the School of Ultimate Leadership (SOUL). [42]

TRADE AND TRANSIT BETWEEN INDIA AND BHUTAN

India’s border with Bhutan in West Bengal traverses from Nagrakata through Jaigaon to Kumargram, while the Assam–Bhutan border passes near towns such as Kumargram, Dadgiri, Darranga, and Udalguri. The Indian towns situated within 15 kilometres of the Bhutan–Assam–West Bengal border are deeply integrated with Bhutan for daily livelihoods. For example, thousands of Indian workers from Jaigaon commute daily to Phuentsholing to work as electricians, plumbers, technicians, accountants, managers, and teachers, with tens of thousands of Indian citizens living between Nagrakata and Udalguri earning their livelihoods through cross-border economic activity with Bhutan. [43] The Bhutanese currency, the Ngultrum (Nu), circulates widely not only in immediate border towns, but also in interior commercial towns across northern West Bengal and Assam such as Hasimara, Madarihat, Banarhat, Alipurduar, Cooch Behar, Dhupgiri, and Bongaigaon—demonstrating the deep economic interdependence between Bhutan and India’s border districts.

Alongside geographical proximity, a long tradition of peace, mutual trust, and open movement between border communities has enabled a vibrant local economic ecosystem. In weekly border markets—such as the Thursday market in the Gelephu–Dadgiri sector in Assam—thousands of Bhutanese citizens travel down from districts including Sarpang, Tsirang, Dagana, Zhemgang, Pemagatshel, Samdrup Jongkhar, Mongar, and Trashigang, generating substantial revenue for local Indian traders. The Bhutanese border town of Phuentsholing serves as the country’s primary commercial hub and gateway for goods and travellers, while the adjacent Indian town of Jaigaon caters extensively to Bhutanese consumers and businesses.

The Jaigaon–Phuentsholing road link through North Bengal remains the most vital trade artery between India and Bhutan, handling more than 90 percent of bilateral overland trade. [44] Several factors explain its dominance: historical connectivity, well-established highway infrastructure, proximity to the seaports of Kolkata and Haldia, access to the major commercial hub of Siliguri, and established customs and documentation facilities. Additionally, the transit corridor linking Phuentsholing to Cooch Behar, Changrabandha (Bangladesh border), Siliguri, and Kakarbhitta (Nepal border) facilitates sub-regional trade across the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal) sub-region. [45]

In contrast, eastern entry points linking Bhutan with Assam—such as Gelephu and Samdrup Jongkhar—have historically been underutilised for large-scale commercial transit despite their strong logistical potential. Logistically, routing goods for central and eastern Bhutan (which encompasses at least twelve of Bhutan’s twenty districts) through Assam via the Samdrup Jongkhar–Gelephu–Guwahati–Dawki corridor is more direct than unloading cargo in Phuentsholing and transporting it across mountainous terrain or back through Indian highways. Historically, however, commercial truckers and tourists avoided the Assam route due to insurgency-related disruptions, frequent strikes (bandhs), and informal extortion along highway stretches, leaving West Bengal as the primary beneficiary of Bhutanese trade and transit. With eastern Bhutan producing agricultural and horticultural commodities (such as vegetables, fruits, cardamom, and oranges) and possessing mineral reserves including limestone, gypsum, and dolomite near the Assam border, the restoration of peace in Assam and the development of the Kokrajhar–Gelephu railway link and the Gelephu Mindfulness City (GMC) special administrative region hold immense potential to transform the Assam–Bhutan border into a thriving trade corridor.

Furthermore, local cross-border initiatives along the Assam–Bhutan frontier—including daily wage employment in Gelephu, cross-border irrigation channels, and people-to-people engagement—have provided sustainable livelihoods for borderland communities (including Bodo, Santhal, Kachari, and Koch-Rajbanshi residents), reducing economic vulnerability along the frontier. [46]

At the institutional level, both nations maintain close defence and security coordination through regular high-level dialogues and joint training to counter external security challenges. The Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT), permanently stationed in western Bhutan since 1961, plays a pivotal role in training and capacity-building for the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA), while Project DANTAK of the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has constructed and maintained critical road, bridge, airfield, and telecom infrastructure across the kingdom for over six decades. Together with India’s sustained socio-economic development assistance, these mechanisms bolster Bhutan’s resilience while reinforcing collective security along the Eastern Himalayan frontier.

CONCLUSION

The presence of two competing Asian powers in the Himalayan region creates a complex strategic environment for smaller neighbours like Bhutan and Nepal. This geostrategic location makes Bhutan central to the security calculus of its larger neighbours. Where Bhutan once navigated between Tibetan and Mongol powers to the north and British India to the south, today it navigates between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India. While Bhutan’s relationship with India remains uniquely deep and multifaceted, global and regional shifts driven by economic modernisation and geopolitical competition are reshaping the Himalayan landscape. China’s aspiration to cement its status as a global and regional superpower involves expanding its military and dual-use infrastructure along its frontiers, seeking to cajole or pressure smaller neighbours into bilateral boundary settlements while competing strategically with India.

Consequently, the long-standing friendship between India and Bhutan should never be taken for granted. India’s developmental support does not mean Bhutan will remain perpetually dependent without its own evolving national aspirations. From New Delhi’s perspective, securing the Siliguri and Northeast corridors, addressing northern border vulnerabilities, and appreciating Bhutan’s domestic democratic and economic evolution require approaching bilateral relations through a pragmatic, realistic, and sensitive lens. Indian foreign policy must continue to align with Bhutan’s strategic priorities, support its economic self-reliance and trade connectivity (especially across the Assam–Bhutan frontier), and account for the shifting balance of power in Asia.

Because Bhutan’s security is inextricably linked with India’s own security interests, developments in Sino-Indian and Sino-Bhutanese relations will inevitably carry implications for the India–Bhutan partnership. Even as geographic, historical, and geo-economic realities ensure that India remains Bhutan’s closest and most indispensable partner, Bhutan cannot ignore the reality of China to its north. As ongoing boundary talks between Thimphu and Beijing progress toward a potential demarcation agreement, close diplomatic coordination, mutual sensitivity, and collective security preparedness between New Delhi and Thimphu will remain essential to preserving peace, stability, and strategic equilibrium in the Eastern Himalayas.

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Ibid.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Saurabh Sharma is an Associate Professor and Head of the Department (HOD) at the Department of International Politics, Central University of Gujarat. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and specialises in international security, conflict and peace studies, post-conflict governance, terrorism, small arms proliferation, and transnational organised crime, with a particular focus on South and Central Asia. His research engages with both theoretical and policy-oriented dimensions of security studies, addressing emerging non-traditional threats and governance challenges in conflict-affected regions. Dr. Sharma has published extensively in reputed academic journals and edited volumes and has contributed to policy discussions on regional security and peacebuilding. He is actively involved in teaching, research supervision, and mentoring students in international politics and security studies.
Geetasri Boruah is a Ph.D. Research Scholar in the Department of International Politics, Central University of Gujarat, working on India’s security issues with a special focus on South Asia. Her research explores geopolitics, border disputes, and strategic challenges that shape India’s national security and foreign policy. She has presented research papers at both international and national conferences, and her work has been published in book chapters and peer-reviewed journals. She worked as a Research Assistant at Jawaharlal Nehru University after completing her Master’s from JNU, and served as an Assistant Professor at Arunachal University of Studies, Namsai, for one year.

Geopolitics of the Eastern Himalayas: India-Bhutan Security Concerns and their Collective Responses