Introduction

he Indo-Pacific region is too extensive to constitute a unified strategic framework. Nonetheless, it has garnered significant attention in global media over recent years. The post-Cold War era Thas seen a redistribution of wealth and power towards Asia, positioning this region as a central pivot of global influence. Major international actors have embraced cooperation as a means to enhance their strategic and economic engagement within the Indo-Pacific. Despite divergent foreign policy objectives concerning the core principles of the Indo-Pacific, Prime Minister Modi is cultivating a resilient, proactive, and influential Indian role in the region. He seeks to do so without formally aligning with the United States or adopting confrontational postures towards China. This paper examines India’s strategic conduct in the Indo-Pacific relative to the United States and China. It posits that Modi’s approach is characterised by pragmatic balancing between these two powers within the region. The analysis emphasises Modi’s ambitions to pursue pragmatic balancing, particularly in light of the United States’ Indo- Pacific strategy. To counterbalance U.S. influence, Modi prioritises maximising strategic autonomy and strengthening India’s maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously, to manage relations with China on the geo-economic front, Modi emphasises sustaining maritime economic flows and avoiding confrontational stances within multilateral frameworks. This dual approach

constitutes a central element of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The paper highlights Modi’s pragmatic approach through the redefinition of India’s balancing act with the United States and China to attain specific foreign policy objectives. This study examines the implications of the emerging Indo-Pacific strategies for India’s strategic positioning. As a founding member of the IPEF, India endeavours to reconcile economic integration with the preservation of strategic autonomy, addressing challenges related to supply chain resilience, digital trade standards, and sustainable development. The analysis explores how India can effectively navigate its role within the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical landscape to advance its national interests, emphasising inclusivity, stability, security, and regional peace. Furthermore, it contends that despite differences in specific approaches, the strategies of major global powers tend to converge on critical issues such as cyber and maritime security and regional connectivity. These focal points offer significant economic opportunities for India to leverage.

Background: The Significance of India’s Indo-Pacific Approach

Before the emergence of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ in the Geopolitical lexicon as an integral tool to assess the protean quality of elusiveness associated with the shifting geostrategic contours, its intellectual origins be traced to the ancient times, as the Indian Ocean had constituted the first epicentre of maritime activities by bringing its rim and much of the Pacific Ocean region closer to each other through robust commercial linkages and cultural bonds (Naidu, 2014). Panikkar (1945) asserted that way before the development of seafaring in the Aegean waters, oceanic navigation became normalized with the coastal people of Peninsular India, and as the first naval and oceanic tradition developed in the Arabian Sea washed lands, the Indian Ocean became the pivot of oceanic interactions owing to monsoons and earlier growth of civilization, constituting the boisterous thoroughfare of cultural and commercial traffic hundreds of years before Columbus and Magellan’s oceanic expeditions. Historically, international relations have been active within the Indo- Pacific region since ancient times, functioning as a unified area for over two millennia before colonial influences. It served as a central hub for global activities, engaging closely with various sub-regions and facilitating mutual benefits long before the rise of the Atlantic-centric world order following the Industrial

Revolution. The dissemination of skills and knowledge occurred gradually, driven by vibrant cultural, civilizational, economic, linguistic, ideational, and religious exchanges across the region. This interconnectedness is exemplified by the Indianized kingdoms of Sri Vijaya and Sailendra in Indonesia, as well as numerous kingdoms in Myanmar and Thailand, from Champa in South Vietnam to the Khmers in Cambodia, demonstrating extensive intra-regional interactions. (Naidu, 2014). Consequently, taking cues from the south Indian Chola kings’ maritime expeditions in the tenth century, and Admiral Zheng He’s overseas naval journeys during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the British colonial dispensation managed to secure and reinvigorate the ancient maritime trade links that existed within the Indian Ocean rim, and the Indo-Pacific region vis-à-vis their prolonged imperial domination, emboldening the region’s strategic and economic significance (ORF, 2020). India’s geopolitical and strategic thinking managed to revivify the Indo- Pacific, as in the closing stages of the Second World War; Jawaharlal Nehru speculated that the Pacific region would emerge as the global geostrategic epicentre with India playing an integral role in its regional dynamics, and it took few more decades for the Nehruvian assertion to materialize, owing to the Cold War-era bipolarity-induced aberrations in international relations (Mishra, 2014). Nehru had predicted that in the near future, the Pacific would constitute the nerve centre of international politics by replacing the Atlantic. As India would exercise a huge degree of influence in the region, it would develop as the nucleus of political and economic activities in the Indian Ocean region. It is noteworthy that India’s geostrategically advantageous and economically significant position, extending from South-east Asia to the Middle East, accords enormous strategic importance in the international system (Nehru, 1944, p.536). The centrality of India in the Asian strategic space can be attributed to the direct historical linkages of the Indo-Pacific conception with Indian nationalism, necessitating geo-historical narratives about the perception of the Indo-Pacific as a new regional entity. During India’s freedom movement, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose advocated the view that fascist nation-states like Italy, Germany, and Japan ought to have been the natural allies of pre-colonial India during British imperialism in the late 1930s. Netaji even had a rendezvous with Karl Haushofer in Munich in 1934, forming an amicable bond with him in order to arrange a meeting with Adolf Hitler later on (Kaushiki, 2021).

Similarly, in 1942, the foreign secretary to the British government of India throughout the Second World War, Sir Olaf Caroe, was instrumental in founding a study group that examined the strategic imperatives and the role of an independent India as a component of a British-led Commonwealth system. The group stressed the notion of India at the centre of an Asiatic system, ensuring the continuance of the Great Game, on the other hand (Panda, 2021). Additionally, the great geopolitical thinker and naval strategist Sardar K.M. Panikkar offered geopolitical reasoning and arguments integral to the nascent contemporary ideational underpinnings of the Indo-Pacific, and Panikkar promulgated the notion of the Indian Ocean as a ‘closed system’, maintaining that India must form a ‘steel ring’ by effectively controlling the farthest stretches of the Indian Ocean (Kaushiki, 2021). K.M. Panikkar’s seminal work, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History (1945) embraced British imperial thought regarding India’s necessity of asserting control over the total Indian Ocean region vis-à-vis maritime checkpoints and major ports in between, and Panikkar while studying the geopolitical treatises of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan on independent India and the Indian Ocean, held that India’s security was fundamentally contingent upon those who were controlling the strategic oceanic realm stretching from the Gulf of Aden on the west to the South China Sea in the east, thereby insisting that the Indian Ocean must truly remain entirely Indian, focusing on the urgency of forward presence (Raghavan, 2019). While promoting the system of forward bases in the vicinity of the Indian chokepoints like Sri Lanka and Mauritius, Panikkar recognised the centrality of geopolitics in constituting the necessary foreign policy foundation in a post-colonial independent India, rather than relegating it to the domain of pseudoscience like Jawaharlal Nehru (Tharoor & Saran, 2020). According to K.M. Panikkar, if there is the creation of a steel ring around the Indian landmass, with suitable air and naval bases at necessary points within this specific ringed territorial demarcation, a strong navy can be created to defend its home waters. Subsequently, the waters necessary for India’s security imperatives can be shielded and converted into a realm of safety. Thus, by effectively equipping and protecting Singapore, Mauritius, and Socotra near Aden with a naval presence strong enough in its home waters, security can safely return to that portion of the Indian Ocean which has a high degree of importance to India (Panikkar, 1945, p. 84). Panikkar’s vision also foresaw future

challenges of India’s maritime security in the form of threats from the Soviet Union and China, apart from apprehending the emergence of the United States as a key rival in the region, owing to its growing interest in the oil shipment from the Persian Gulf. Thus, Panikkar advocated the notion of a special international organisation for Indian Ocean security, which would be predicated on a council of regional powers helmed by India, while keeping Great Britain, South Africa, and Australia in important positions (Kaushiki, 2021). Similarly, eminent Indian historian Kalidas Nag and British anthropologist Augustus Henry Keane managed to employ anthropology, art, archaeology, socio-cultural norms, political linkages, maritime economics, and commercial concepts as the key variables in defining a distinct ‘Indo-Pacific Domain’, in their writings between 1880 and 1945 (Mishra, 2014). Associating the nomenclature with a cultural and civilizational entity, Kalidas Nag’s version of the Indo-Pacific was used to trace India’s historical commercial, cultural, religious, and trade links with the maritime universe. In his famous 1941 book, titled India and the Pacific World, Nag mentioned that the Indo-Pacific was referred to as ‘Australasia’ by the British, ‘Oceania’ by the Continental scholars and experts, and Nag asserted that this particular region could be termed ‘Greater India’ (Panda, 2021). Numerous historical narratives and strategic scholars have presented diverse perspectives on the Indo-Pacific region over time. The concept of the Indo-Pacific has become more defined, experiencing a resurgence in recent years. This development is primarily driven by significant shifts in the geopolitical environment, notably the impacts of economic globalisation. Advancements in transportation, connectivity, and communication during the 21st century have further contributed to this renewed focus. (World Economic Forum, 2019).

Decoding India’s Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Theatre

he Indo-Pacific construct has garnered significant attention in recent years. In embracing this emergent geographical concept for regionalism, key global actors have articulated comprehensiveTstrategies for their engagement with the region. These strategies are projected to reconfigure global security and economic architecture. In light of its geopolitical positioning, the global pivot towards the Indo-Pacific bears direct implications for India.

The Indian civilisation’s rich maritime history throws light on the centrality of the Indian Ocean in shaping its strategic posture for several centuries. As the Indian Ocean serves as India’s lifeline, which is integral to its security and prosperity, India is surrounded by it on three sides, having a coastline of 7500 km, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covering 2 million square km, 1380 islands, rocks, and 13 coastal states. Thus, India’s security domain essentially possesses a strong maritime dimension, apart from possessing 13 major, 200 non-major ports, and 200,000 fishing vessels (Gupta, 2018, p.286). Constituting the world’s main trade artery, the Indian Ocean consists of six sea lanes and choke points for the passage of maritime traffic, which include the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Aden, the Malacca Straits and Indonesia establishing a linkage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea with the Pacific Ocean, Sunda, Lombok, the Ombai and the Wetar Straits of Indonesia effectively (ORF, 2020). Notwithstanding its enormous geostrategic significance, there is a vast array of challenges and maritime concerns for the Indian foreign policy dispensation in the Indian Ocean region, which involve the safety and security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC); terrorism, radicalization, drugs, and human trafficking; illegal fishing activities in the Indian waters; security of trade; migration; pollution of the marine ecosystem, the impact of climate change, tsunamis, and associated weather-related events (Gupta, 2019). However, foreign policy shifts during Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s era diluted the geostrategic potential of the Indian Ocean, as the Indian Navy was reduced to a low-profile, emasculated, and neglected Cinderella-like service, representing a position of weakness by establishing itself as a Zone of Peace (IOZOP) (Jaishankar, 2020, p. 182). Before the formal development and widespread adoption of the ‘Indo- Pacific’ concept within policy discourse, a significant geopolitical transformation occurred during the first decade of the 21st century. The Indian Ocean was increasingly regarded as a region of strategic opportunity for India. In this context, a novel geographical framework for Indian foreign policy emerged, characterised by the notion of the ‘extended neighbourhood.’ This concept was officially articulated by former Prime Minister Inder Gujral in 1997 and gained prominence throughout the 2000s. Within the paradigm of ‘Omni-directional diplomacy,’ India pursued a dual strategic approach. The ‘Look East’ policy facilitated engagement across the Bay of Bengal, while the ‘Look West’ initiative

expanded India’s strategic outreach across the Arabian Sea. These strategies effectively extended India’s initial focus on the northern Indian Ocean into the southern Indian Ocean Region. (Scott, 2015, p.468). The Manmohan Singh-led United Progressive Front (UPA) government in 2007 categorically declared that the principal area of Indian maritime interest extended from the Persian Gulf in the north to Antarctica in the south, and further, from the Cape of Good Hope and the Horn of Africa in the west to the Malacca Straits, Malaysian archipelagos, and Indonesia in the east (Doyle & Rumley, 2019). The analysis of India’s role within the emerging strategic construct of the Indo-Pacific has tended to highlight the country’s limited resources and in- built constraints, including an unwillingness to take sides.1 This is explained in terms of continuity with India’s traditional position adopted during the Cold War and described in various ways, such as “fence-sitting,”2 or India’s profile as a reluctant power.3 Within the setting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) that has reemerged since 2017,4 India has also been referred to as the group’s “weak link.”5 Out of the four countries in the Quad (United States,

1 For a range of recent views: Pant, Harsh, and Abhijnan Rej. 2018. “Is India Ready for the

Indo-Pacific?” The Washington Quarterly 41: 47–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/01636 60x.2018.1485403.; Singh, Sinderpal. 2019. “The Indo-Pacific and India-U.S. Strategic Convergence: An Assessment.” Asia Policy 26 (1): 77–94. https://doi.org/10.1353/ asp.2019.0015.; Rajagopalan, Rajesh. 2020. “Evasive Balancing: India’s Unviable Indo-Pacific Strategy.” International Affairs 96 (1): 75–93. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz22; Kumar, P. Kesava. 2021. “India Balancing China: Exploring Soft Balancing Through Indo-Pacific.” Millennial Asia 13 (2): 339–59. https://doi.org/10.1177/0976399621998274; Ahmad Khan Tanveer, 2023. “Limited Hard Balancing: Explaining India’s Counter Response to Chinese Encirclement,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 6, no. 3 (): 92–108.

2 Used in 1951 to describe India’s position of neutrality during the early Cold War: Levi,

Werner. 1951a. “India Debates Foreign Policy.” Far Eastern Survey 20 (5): 49–52. https://doi. org/10.1525/as.1951.20.5.01p0664c.Werner Levi, “India Debates Foreign Policy,” Far Eastern Survey, 20, no. 5 (1951): 49 – 52; and most recently, Matias Spektor, “In Defence of the Fence Sitters: What the West Gets Wrong About Hedging,” Foreign Affairs 102, no. 3 (2023): 8 – 16.

3 Mitra, Subrata K. 2003. “The Reluctant Hegemon: India’s Self-Perception and the South Asian

Strategic Environment.” Contemporary South Asia 12 (3): 399–417. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 0958493032000175914.

4 See Madan, Tanvi. 2017. “The Rise, Fall, And Rebirth of the ‘Quad’.” War on the Rocks,

November 16. https://warontherocks.com/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/.

5 Grossman, Derek. n.d. “India Is the Weakest Link in the Quad.” Foreign Policy. https://

foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/23/india-is-the-weakest-link-in-the-quad/;and Chet Lee, “India:

Japan, Australia and India), India is the only country that is not a treaty ally of the United States (US). Unlike Japan and Australia, it does not have a formal defence commitment to fight alongside any of the Quad countries in a war. As such, maritime interests contributed to increased Indian Ocean naval operations; the formation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) as a temporary coordinating arrangement prioritising maritime security, meant for mobilising disaster aid and humanitarian assistance following the Tsunami of December 2004, constituted an important milestone in the subsequent materialisation of the vision of a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific (Borah, 2021). Consequently, India’s erstwhile Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh maintained that India’s strategic footprint extends to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean, and such an ontological perception will determine India’s strategic behaviour and defence planning in the near future, thereby generating leadership claims that the Indian Navy ought to be the most significant maritime power in the Indian Ocean region (ORF, 2020). Nonetheless, India is deepening and widening its maritime security cooperation with QUAD members and key Indo- Pacific partners. This is not only to establish itself in the region as a net security provider but also as part of a coordinated effort to offset the power asymmetry between India and China. Eventually, important naval formulations heralded geopolitically- informed transformations, as the Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2004 and India’s Maritime Military Strategy of 2007 signalled a quantum jump of India’s maritime imagination from a tiny coastal-hugging dormant brown-water fleet to a gigantic ocean-going blue-water fleet, holding the potential of significant power projection throughout the Indian Ocean littoral region, and thus the Indian Ocean was chalked out as the region of primary strategic interest for India’s foreign policy establishment, with variegated diplomatic, combat, and constabulary roles assigned to the Indian navy (World Economic Forum, 2019). Apart from reinvigorating epistemological insight from Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett’s writings, these naval publications categorically emphasised geopolitics and geoeconomics as the key determinants in influencing India’s maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean (Scott, 2015). India has actively contributed to the development of maritime frameworks within the Indian Ocean region, while simultaneously advancing The Quad’s Weakest Link,” The Diplomat (2021). https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/ india-the-quads-weakest-link/

the modernisation of its naval forces. It has also enhanced diplomatic relations with littoral states to restore maritime connectivity since the early 2000s. For example, India established a formal trilateral maritime cooperation agreement with Sri Lanka and the Maldives in 2014. It has supported countries such as Mauritius and Seychelles in strengthening their coastal security measures. India has secured collaborative efforts with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles to improve maritime logistics. The construction of the Chabahar port in Iran exemplifies its strategy to enhance connectivity with Central Asia and Afghanistan. Following the October 2017 India-EU summit, India engaged in intensified cooperation dialogues with France and Thailand to bolster maritime collaboration. In 2015, India provided drinking water and humanitarian aid to the Maldives. Additionally, the Indian Navy has conducted anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia and executed evacuation and rescue missions for Indian and foreign nationals from conflict zones (Gupta, 2018). Further, the Indian Navy regularly conducts joint naval exercises with the navies of the U.K., the U.S.A., Japan, France, and Russia while providing training to foreign sailors. In this context, at the service level, the multilateral ‘Milan’ naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal have been orchestrated by India since 1995, and by 2014, it managed to encompass vital actors in the Indian Ocean region, ranging from the Maldives, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mauritius, Seychelles to Brunei, Vietnam, and the Philippines, eventually becoming a political statement and valuable networking exercise for asserting India’s strategic and diplomatic interests across the Indo-Pacific maritime space, unhindered by regional hegemons like the U.S. and China (Scott, 2015). Moreover, the re-emergence of the Quad has reinvigorated the ‘Malabar’ joint naval exercises involving the naval forces of India, the U.S.A., Japan, and Australia in recent times (The Wire, 2019). Attempting to complement its military hard power presence with diplomatic soft power persuasion vis-à-vis the micro-Island states and major littoral states around the Indian Ocean Rim, India has managed to strengthen its maritime diplomacy by spearheading and being a vociferous member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) since 1997, to foster distinctiveness of Indian Ocean-based identity and extend cooperation in different issue areas. At the government level, India also established the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2008, asserting its unofficial degree of pre-eminence within the forum (Jaishankar, 2016).

It is noteworthy that while India’s EEZ stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its coastline, India has submitted an official claim to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for expanding its continental shelf by extending its EEZ up to 350 nautical miles, apart from being assigned specific areas in the Indian Ocean for deep-sea mining purposes. As far as the regional dynamics of the Indo-Pacific is concerned, the ‘blue economy’ constitutes the new site and arena of growth which involves fishing, sea mining activities, the advancement in marine technology, sustainable fishing activities, the safe harnessing of ocean energy, and safe utilization or sustainable exploitation of oceanic resources, whereby India has managed to champion capacity-building and confidence-building measures in these issue areas across the Indo-Pacific, while fostering robust cooperation with other states in the region (The Wire, 2019). An integral component of India’s maritime activities involves building coastal connectivity while connecting several coastal towns to the hinterland, and as a result, the multi-million dollar ‘Sagarmala’ project has been sanctioned in order to upgrade the Indian ports, bolster coastal shipping, and strengthen connectivity to the hinterland effectively (Centre for Strategic & International Studies, 2019). The Indian Ocean’s paramount importance in shaping India’s strategic posture and foreign policy imperatives is thus unparalleled, wherein its underlying ethos is essentially a consultative one, characterised by pluralism and syncretism.

Indian Foreign Policy and the Indo-Pacific: Evolution and the Emerging Dynamics

The prevailing multipolar liberal international order is characterised by dispersed power structures, fragmented geopolitical boundaries, and significant shifts in regional influence. The Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are becoming increasingly interconnected due to the rapid expansion of trade, alongside China’s territorial ambitions and assertive regional behaviour. This dynamic has contributed to the emergence of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a cohesive geopolitical concept. In this evolving security context, the South China Sea and East China Sea, located just beyond the Straits of Malacca, have experienced renewed geopolitical tensions. China’s rapid military modernisation, enhanced geoeconomic capabilities, and expanding naval presence reflect its rising influence.

Together, these developments foster a volatile security environment in the region (Gupta, 2018). The art of mastering a cogent Indo-Pacific approach essentially rests on perfecting a coherent Indian Ocean strategy, which is integral to India’s security interests, by focusing attention on maritime neighbours; securing relationship- building as expressed in terms of political transparency, increased cooperation, trust-building, and confidence-building; advocating an integrated view of trade, infrastructure, tourism, environment, blue economy and security imperatives; promoting capability-building vis-à-vis the provision of radars, vessels, coastal surveillance equipment, aircraft, and establishing maritime infrastructure (Jaishankar, 2020, p.189). In the contemporary period under Narendra Modi, the Indian government’s security policy has been predicated on three underlying assumptions, namely becoming a ‘leading power’, acting as a ‘net security provider’ efficaciously, and effectively realising the notion of ‘SAGAR’ or ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’ (Hall, 2019, p.131). Intended to advance strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, Modi’s ‘SAGAR’ concept, constituting the edifice of India’s Indo-Pacific approach and embracing an open, inclusive, and pluralistic ethos, which was initially outlined in his speech in Mauritius in March 2015, appropriated the American, Australian, and Japanese notions of a ‘rules-based order’, linking it into a more diverse story about India’s rich maritime past, ancient civilizational linkages, and the teleological pursuit underlying India’s economic ambitions surrounding a ‘New India’ (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2019). As Narendra Modi emboldened India’s Indo-Pacific approach through the ‘SAGAR’ maritime doctrine, the aspiration of which is contingent on the promotion of prosperity for all stakeholder countries in the region; driven by norms; governed by rules; adherence to democratic principles like the freedom of navigation and overflight, Modi’s keynote address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 1st June 2018, outlined his vision of promoting regional security in the maintenance of a democratic rules-based international order in the free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, advocating the importance of espousing the notion of strategic autonomy from India’s perspective (Carnegie Live, 2020). In contemporary international politics, India’s version of the Indo-Pacific essentially extends from the western coast of North America to the eastern shores near the Horn of Africa, constituting a highly heterogeneous region with

different nations having divergent degrees of development (Panda, 2021). Widely regarded as a major foreign policy speech of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it strongly emphasised India’s approach toward the Indo-Pacific as one based on inclusiveness.6 Mastering the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision vis-à-vis forums like ‘SAGAR’ and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), India secures proactive engagement with its partners in the Indo-Pacific region bilaterally and by virtue of various multilateral, plurilateral, and minilateral platforms, in a plethora of domains like Blue Economy, maritime security, naval connectivity, disaster management, and capability-building, subsequently establishing a distinct Indo-Pacific wing in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) division in April 2019, intended to amalgamate the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of India, the U.S.A., Japan, and Australia into one common Indo-Pacific umbrella (Saha & Mishra, 2020). Consequently, on 4th November 2019 at the East Asia Summit in Bangkok, Thailand, Prime Minister Modi had launched the IPOI, whereby its prime motive was to secure stability, peace and prosperity of the maritime realm as an extension of India’s SAGAR vision while acting as a mechanism for developing cooperation among like-minded nations in their pursuit towards ‘free, open, inclusive, prosperous, and rules-based Indo-Pacific’, constructed on the edifice of India’s Act East Policy (stressing on the Eastern Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific) and the Act West Policy (emphasizing the Western Indian Ocean) (Jaishankar, 2020). Furthermore, an Oceania division was introduced within the MEA in September 2020, in order to channelise India’s diplomatic and administrative focus on the region extending from the Western Pacific to the Andaman Sea. Essentially, India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is predicated on certain important pillars, namely maritime security; maritime ecology; littoral resources; capacity-building, capability-building, resource-sharing and information- sharing; disaster risk reduction and disaster management; trade, connectivity, and maritime transport; science, technology, cultural, and academic cooperation (Jha Bhaskar, 2021). Recognising the evolving landscape of international relations, India’s Indo-Pacific strategy emphasises engagement with its immediate neighbours,

6 Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue, June 1, 2018. https://www.mea.

gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+ at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018

including all South Asian nations. It also extends to its broader outer neighbourhood, encompassing Gulf countries in the west and ASEAN and Southeast Asian nations in the east. India seeks to forge partnerships and collaborate with like-minded countries in the region, characterised by shared values, common objectives, and effective operational outcomes. These efforts span from Pacific Islands to archipelagos in the western Indian Ocean and the eastern coast of Africa. Furthermore, India participates in multiple multilateral networks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) with the United States, Japan, and Australia. It is also involved in initiatives like the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) with Japan and Australia, as well as various trilateral arrangements including India-France-Australia, India-Australia-Indonesia, and India-Japan-U.S. mechanisms (ORF, 2021). As India perceives the Indo-Pacific as a vast geographic and strategic expanse where ASEAN acts as a bridge connecting the two great oceans, at the crux of this vision lie the elements of inclusiveness, openness, transparency, unity, and ASEAN-centrality, whereby sustainable connectivity initiatives advocating mutual benefit are continually promoted (Chatham House, 2021). Additionally, acknowledging the nested security dilemma vis-à-vis maritime contestation in the form of Credible Chinese threat perception, exacerbated by the COVID-19 Pandemic-induced developments, the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S.A. as the global policeman state, weakening of multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO), security in the Indo-Pacific region is maintained through freedom of navigation and overflight; constructive dialogue; unhindered commercial and trade relations; a common rules-based maritime order; peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law (Mathur, 2021). Recent challenges have necessitated a substantial reorientation of India’s foreign policy strategy, as escalating security and strategic threats have reinforced the importance of the Quad in the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo- Pacific is characterised by extensive maritime territorial disputes, spanning from the Persian Gulf to the mid-Indian Ocean Chagos Archipelago and the southwestern Pacific, alongside ambiguous and complex agreements concerning sustainable fishery management. China’s enhanced presence and assertive stance in the Indian Ocean littoral, driven by its aggressive “String of Pearls” strategy, pose significant security concerns for India within the Indo-Pacific framework. This geopolitical tension is further intensified by contentious events such as

the 2017 Doklam standoff between Indian and Chinese forces and the 2020 Galwan River Valley clashes along the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh. Additionally, budgetary limitations hinder the Indian Navy’s capacity for modernisation, coordination, and the development of synergies among various stakeholders. (Saha & Mishra, 2020). Socio-economic disparities intensified by the COVID-19 pandemic are likely to impede comprehensive economic integration and regional stability within the Indo-Pacific region. These inequalities threaten to reverse years of progress made by India towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The pandemic has significantly undermined the health sector, nutrition, education, and political institutions, leading to a decline in their effectiveness and resilience. Furthermore, it has eroded institutional commitments, strained logistical capabilities, and disrupted supply chains. These disruptions have contributed to an increased trust deficit, while also exacerbating crises related to legitimacy and accountability. (The Institute of World Politics, 2020). India’s conception of the Indo-Pacific primarily functions as a conceptual framework rather than an institutional regional entity. It emphasises regional cohesion, economic and security interdependence, and strategic cooperation. With the decline of multilateralism and the rise of plurilateral and minilateral groupings such as the Quad, the future trajectory of the Indo-Pacific will depend on efforts to address global challenges. These include climate change mitigation, pandemic response, and regional stability. The inaugural summit of the Quad nations on 12th March 2021 produced a joint statement advocating for a free, open, and inclusive rules-based order. This order is to be rooted in international law, aiming to promote security and prosperity while deterring regional threats. Furthermore, the Quad’s cooperative agenda has expanded to encompass vaccine collaboration, climate change mitigation, critical and emerging technologies, semiconductors, cyberspace, critical materials, supply chains, and regional connectivity (Pulipaka & Musaddi, 2021). Additionally, the Indo-Pacific is witnessing the unfolding of several minilateral formations like the India-Japan-U.S.A. and India-Japan-Australia to promote diplomatic and security cooperation, apart from the proactive role of various forums like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, the East Asia Summit Forum (EAS), intended to function as a bridge between multiple Indo-Pacific sub-regions (Avdaliani, 2020). In recent times, India’s two-plus-

two Defence and Foreign Minister-level dialogues with Japan, Australia, and the U.S.A. reflect the increasing institutionalization tendencies among the liberal democratic nation-states in the Indo-Pacific region (ORF, 2021). The necessity to revivify the global supply chain resilience in an era of segmented globalization has been internalized by the Quad nations, as India, Japan, and Australia have teamed up for the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), reiterating the normative quotient of the Indo-Pacific by coming together to foster economic cooperation for their mutual benefit, while India and Australia have emphasized the significance of SCRI in their two-plus-two ministerial meeting’s joint statement in September 2021 (Pulipaka & Musaddi, 2021).

Strategic Challenges and Imperatives for India

In 2026, India’s strategic role in the Indo-Pacific is shaped by its transition toward becoming a “shaping power,”7 yet it faces several entrenched and emerging challenges. These range from structural asymmetries with China to new operational requirements in “grey-zone” competition. The Indo-Pacific is currently the primary theatre of US-China strategic competition, forcing India to navigate a complex balancing act. The following section discusses the strategic challenges for India:

¾ Great Power Competition and China’s Assertiveness: The expanding

influence of China, exemplified by its assertive posture in the South China Sea, extensive infrastructure investments via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and a growing naval presence, presents significant strategic challenges for India. Specifically, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an integral component of the BRI, traverses disputed territory in Kashmir, thereby exacerbating India’s sovereignty concerns. Furthermore, China’s increasing sway in the Indian Ocean region, underscored by the establishment of a military installation in Djibouti and its operational control over strategic maritime assets such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, intensifies India’s security dilemma. Effectively addressing China’s burgeoning influence necessitates both sustained diplomatic engagement and robust defence preparedness. Although the year 2025 witnessed a tactical de-escalation in India-China relations

7 A nation that proactively defines global and regional agendas rather than merely reacting to the

actions of others.

subsequent to border disengagement efforts in late 2024, the bilateral relationship continues to be characterised by a profound strategic trust deficit. Events such as the arbitrary detention of an Indian national in Shanghai during late 2025 serve as salient indicators of this precarious stability.

¾ Capacity and Infrastructure Constraints: Although India articulates

ambitious regional engagement objectives, their practical realisation is frequently impeded by infrastructural deficiencies and bureaucratic impediments. Projects undertaken within India’s northeastern region and in contiguous nations commonly experience protracted delays, thereby impinging upon India’s perceived credibility as a development collaborator. In stark contrast to China’s expeditious project implementation, India’s infrastructural initiatives are often characterised by insufficient financial allocations, inadequate inter- agency coordination, and convoluted approval mechanisms.

¾ Geopolitical Instability in the Region: The Indo-Pacific region is

characterised by significant political instability in various states, notably Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. These internal instabilities exert a profound influence on regional collaborative frameworks, migratory patterns, and geopolitical security dynamics. Consequently, India is compelled to navigate the complexities of balancing its geopolitical imperatives with its commitment to humanitarian principles and democratic ideals. Moreover, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait further exacerbate the complexities of India’s foreign policy calculus, particularly given its endeavour to uphold strategic autonomy amidst concurrent engagement with Western geopolitical entities.

¾ Balancing Relations with Major Powers: India’s Indo-Pacific strategic

framework necessitates the skillful management of intricate diplomatic relationships with key global powers. Although India has cultivated reinforced alliances with the United States and its associated partners, it concurrently sustains a long-established defence collaboration with the Russian Federation. The imperative of equilibrating these diverse relationships amidst prevailing geopolitical rivalries, exemplified by the Sino-American and Russo-American tensions, consequently, demands considerable diplomatic dexterity. India’s circumspect posture

concerning matters such as the conflict in Ukraine has elicited reproval from Western allied nations, thereby underscoring the inherent difficulty in upholding a non-aligned yet strategically engaged international stance.

¾ Multilateralism vs. Bilateralism: India affirms its commitment

to ASEAN centrality and the broader principle of multilateralism; however, the efficacy of regional institutional mechanisms is frequently constrained by internal discord and exogenous geopolitical pressures. A significant challenge resides in discerning the optimal balance between engagement with established multilateral platforms and more agile, often minilateral or bilateral, arrangements, exemplified by groupings such as the Quad. Furthermore, India faces the imperative of addressing the potential ramifications of its exclusion from influential regional trade blocs, notably the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an outcome that could adversely impact its economic competitiveness. To navigate this contested landscape, India is pursuing several core imperatives:

1. Maritime Security & Naval Presence: With over 90% of trade by volume

passing through sea routes, maritime security is non-negotiable. India is modernising its navy with indigenous carriers and advanced submarines to serve as a regional net security provider, particularly across critical choke points like the Strait of Malacca.

2. Strengthening Strategic Partnerships: India utilises “mini-lateral”

platforms like the Quad (US, Japan, Australia) to address shared security concerns, particularly regarding China’s assertiveness. It also prioritises its Act East Policy by deepening ties with ASEAN, designating 2026 as the “ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation”.

3. Infrastructure & Technology Diplomacy: To offer alternatives to

China’s Belt and Road Initiative, India is leading projects like the India- Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). It also promotes its Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI)—including UPI and Aadhaar—as a scalable model for the Global South.

4. Economic Resilience & Supply Chains: Under the “Self-reliant India”

campaign, India seeks to decouple from over-dependence on single nations by participating in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework

(IPEF) and fostering resilient supply chains in critical sectors like semiconductors and green energy.

5. Upholding a Rules-Based Order: India consistently advocates for the UN

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), freedom of navigation, and peaceful dispute resolution to prevent regional dominance by any single power.

6. Balancing China: While China’s presence in the Indo-Pacific is

undeniable, India must push for a rules-based order that emphasises sovereignty, freedom of navigation, and peaceful resolution of disputes. This includes standing firm in multilateral forums like the UN and working through platforms like the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI).

7. Act East, Think Indo-Pacific: The evolution of India’s Look East to

Act East Policy must now expand to include the Indo-Pacific construct. From trilateral dialogues to capacity building in island nations, India’s role as a regional net security provider must be matched with diplomatic agility.

8. Geopolitical Balancing: Managing the “paradox of continuity” with

the US (especially during trade friction) while maintaining a strategic partnership with Russia.

Navigating the Way Forward Amidst Challenges and Emerging Dynamics

India’s maritime approach in the Indo-Pacific, anchored in strategic deterrence, robust security measures, and regional collaboration, underscores its aspiration to emerge as a prominent regional power dedicated to upholding stability and security. Its steadfast commitment to self-reliance, extensive multilateral engagement, and resolve to maintain a rules-based order within the Indo-Pacific uniquely position it to address contemporary challenges. Beyond solely focusing on maritime security, the Indo-Pacific visions of these nations prominently feature cooperative efforts aimed at ensuring the sustainable utilisation of maritime resources, particularly through combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Other key aspects include fostering the blue economy

and mitigating marine pollution, alongside addressing the rise in sea levels driven by climate change. Given that India also confronts these specific challenges, the ongoing Indo-Pacific realignment among various stakeholders presents New Delhi with a significant chance to deepen financial and technological cooperation with advanced countries, thereby jointly tackling climate change-related and other pressing maritime issues. This prevailing consensus on maritime security has consequently enabled India to strengthen its naval and military cooperation with like-minded nations, essential for safeguarding its territorial waters and critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). India’s Indo-Pacific Policy grapples with several interconnected challenges. Foremost is balancing strategic autonomy—India’s core foreign policy principle—which complicates alliances with major powers, as it avoids entrapment in binding security commitments amid intensifying great-power competition (Fravel, 2019). Resource limitations significantly impede progress, with military modernisation, logistical capabilities, and the defence industrial base exhibiting a deficit relative to major geopolitical actors such as China, primarily attributable to fiscal and technological constraints. Economic vulnerabilities, encompassing trade imbalances, supply chain dependencies, and heightened investment competition, critically undermine the long-term sustainability of strategic initiatives. Furthermore, a prevailing deficit of trust with regional partners, particularly among Southeast Asian states apprehensive of hegemonic rivalries, necessitates the implementation of sustained confidence-building measures and consistent diplomatic engagement to bolster India’s leadership aspirations. India’s Indo-Pacific Policy is positioned for substantial progression, leveraging conducive opportunities and dynamic strategic pathways that capitalise on its inherent strengths in inter-connectivity, multilateral institutional leadership, and robust development cooperation. Within the domain of digital and energy connectivity, India is actively cultivating enhanced relationships through digital diplomacy initiatives, cybersecurity cooperative frameworks, and renewable energy alliances. This is notably evidenced by calculated investments in transregional digital infrastructure and sustainable energy frameworks, which collectively foster sustainable socio-economic development and robust strategic interdependencies. Furthermore, India’s ascendant institutional leadership, notably underscored by its G20 presidency, affords it the capacity to exercise normative influence on pressing global challenges such as climate change

mitigation, trade regulatory frameworks, and technological standardisation. Concurrently, it is advancing comprehensive paradigms of equitable development specifically adapted to the prevailing Indo-Pacific geopolitical and socio- economic dynamics. In conjunction with these endeavours, the expansion of its development cooperation through preferential credit facilities, comprehensive capacity-building programs, and strategic humanitarian assistance initiatives significantly reinforces India’s diplomatic influence and soft power projection. This is particularly evident within the littoral states of the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, consequently expanding its geopolitical reach and cultivating enduring regional alliances. To navigate the evolving Indo-Pacific landscape in 2026, India is pivoting from broad visions to high-stakes operational doctrines and institutionalised partnerships. Faced with persistent “grey-zone” challenges and economic dependencies, New Delhi is adopting an “Act Fast” approach to supplement its “Act East” policy. A defining change is the release of the Indian Maritime Doctrine 2025 (IMD-25) on 4th December 2025. This apex document formalises India’s response to modern maritime competition:

¾ Grey-Zone Readiness: Formally recognises the “No War, No Peace”

category to address hybrid threats like cyberattacks, maritime coercion, and irregular warfare below the threshold of full-scale conflict.

¾ Integrated Multi-Domain Operations: Prioritises theaterisation by

ensuring seamless jointness between space, cyber, and underwater domain awareness (UDA).

¾ First Responder Role: Reaffirms India’s commitment as a “preferred

security partner” in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), as seen in the 2025 Operation Brahma providing disaster relief to earthquake-hit Myanmar. To effectively navigate the Indo-Pacific in 2026, India is moving toward institutionalising its regional presence through a combination of accelerated maritime infrastructure, high-level diplomatic leadership, and refined security doctrines. The following strategic steps are discussed as:

1. Codifying a Unified Indo-Pacific Doctrine: Analysts posit that India’s

existing strategy comprises a fragmented collection of initiatives, including SAGAR, Act East, and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). The development of a unified, government-endorsed doctrine would delineate explicit “red lines” and sector-specific priorities for

international collaborators.

2. Operationalising the MAHASAGAR Vision: The MAHASAGAR

(Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) framework was introduced in 2025. It broadens India’s maritime strategy from the Indian Ocean to encompass a wider Indo- Pacific cooperative architecture. In early 2026, this strategic vision is being concretely realised through the commissioning of 19 warships. This marks India’s most substantial annual fleet expansion to date.

3. Invest in Maritime Infrastructure: Investing in maritime infrastructure

constitutes a fundamental component of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy. This encompasses the development of ports, shipyards, coastal highways, and logistics hubs to enhance connectivity, facilitate trade, and expand naval capabilities. India is upgrading significant ports such as Chabahar in Iran to gain access to Central Asia and Sittwe in Myanmar to bolster regional trade networks. Additionally, domestic ports are being modernised through the Sagarmala Project, which aims to improve port efficiency, decrease logistics costs, and promote coastal shipping. This infrastructural investment enhances India’s capacity to serve as a maritime security provider, facilitates monitoring of vital sea routes, and provides alternatives to China’s port-centric influence via the Belt and Road Initiative. Furthermore, these developments support economic growth by integrating India more comprehensively into global supply chains.

4. Strengthen Regional Diplomacy: Enhancing regional diplomacy

involves deepening India’s political, economic, and cultural relationships with nations across the Indo-Pacific to foster trust, cooperation, and influence. India actively collaborates with regional organisations such as ASEAN, BIMSTEC, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to advance shared objectives in security, trade, and development. Through its Act East Policy, India seeks to strengthen alliances with Southeast and East Asian countries. The country also endorses ASEAN centrality and participates in multilateral forums including the East Asia Summit and ADMM-Plus. Furthermore, India provides development assistance, capacity-building initiatives, and disaster relief

efforts to smaller island nations, enhancing its stature as a responsible regional actor. Concentrating on diplomatic engagement enables India to counterbalance China’s expanding influence, promote regional stability, and secure strategic alliances within the Indo-Pacific region.

5. Enhance Defence Modernisation: Enhancing defence modernisation

is crucial for India to bolster its military capabilities and safeguard its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. India is advancing its armed forces through the adoption of sophisticated technologies, modern weaponry, and the promotion of indigenous defence production under the Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat initiatives. This development encompasses the creation of next-generation warships, submarines, missile systems, and surveillance infrastructure. India is also expanding joint military exercises, such as the Malabar exercise with the United States, Japan, and Australia, to enhance coordination and interoperability among allied navies. Agreements like the Logistics Exchange Agreements with countries including the U.S., France, and Australia improve India’s capacity to operate across broader maritime domains. Modernisation of defence capabilities ensures India’s ability to deter potential threats, secure vital sea lanes, and serve as a dependable security partner in the Indo-Pacific region.

6. Prioritise Trade Agreements: Prioritising trade agreements enables India

to enhance its economic influence and deepen integration within Indo- Pacific economies. India actively participates in bilateral and regional trade negotiations to augment exports, attract foreign investment, and diversify its economic dependencies. Recent developments include the India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) and ongoing negotiations with the United Kingdom, European Union, and ASEAN member states. India also engages in initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), which emphasises equitable trade, supply chain resilience, and clean energy collaboration. By emphasising trade agreements, India gains access to new markets, bolsters domestic industries, and seeks to counterbalance China’s regional economic influence. This strategy promotes inclusive, rules-based economic growth within the region.

7. Promote Digital and Green Connectivity: Advancing digital and

green connectivity is essential for fostering sustainable and inclusive development throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Digital connectivity encompasses the expansion of internet access, digital infrastructure, cybersecurity measures, and financial technology collaboration with partner nations. India actively promotes digital capacity-building in countries such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, and ASEAN member states through initiatives like Digital India and e-governance projects. Green connectivity emphasises the development of sustainable infrastructure, promotion of clean energy sources, and the establishment of climate- resilient systems. India spearheads international efforts such as the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and supports green port development initiatives under the Sagarmala program. These endeavours enable India to cultivate strategic partnerships, advance sustainable development objectives, and provide alternatives to China’s infrastructure initiatives, thereby strengthening India’s position as a responsible and forward- looking Indo-Pacific power. On the other hand, India is moving beyond bilateral ties to create permanent institutional frameworks and Emerging Regional Dynamics in 2026. They are discussed as follows:

 Year of Maritime Cooperation: Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared

2026 as the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation. This initiative aims to move past simple naval exercises to joint blue economy research and naval logistics support at Indian eastern ports.

 IORA Chairmanship (2025–2027): Starting in late 2025, India leads the

Indian Ocean Rim Association. Key 2026 goals include overcoming IORA’s historical funding constraints and harmonising its goals with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP).

 Advanced Defence Integration: Participation in high-end drills like Exercise

Sea Dragon 2026 in Guam specifically focuses on anti-submarine warfare tactics alongside Quad partners. India’s perception of the Indo-Pacific is essentially a conceptual framework rather than a regional organization, thereby focusing on cohesiveness, economic and security interdependence, and thus with the dilapidation of

multilateralism and the proliferation of plurilateral and minilateral groupings like the Quad, the future of the Indo-Pacific, spearheaded by India vis-à-vis the Quad and other Quad Plus frameworks, will be predicated on mitigating climate change, managing responses, containing the COVID-19 Pandemic, as the formal inaugural summit of the Quad nations on 12th March 2021 propounded a joint statement for the promotion of a free, open, inclusive rules-based order, grounded in international law to foster security and prosperity while deterring threats in the Indo-Pacific region, and extending their cooperative agenda to include vaccine collaboration; climate change mitigation; critical and emerging technologies; semiconductors; cyberspace and critical materials; supply chains; connectivity among others (Pulipaka & Musaddi, 2021). Additionally, the Indo-Pacific is witnessing the unfolding of several minilateral formations like the India-Japan-U.S.A. and India-Japan-Australia to promote diplomatic and security cooperation, apart from the proactive role of various forums like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, the East Asia Summit Forum (EAS), intended to function as a bridge between multiple Indo-Pacific sub-regions (Avdaliani, 2020). In recent times, India’s two-plus- two Defence and Foreign Minister-level dialogues with Japan, Australia, and the U.S.A. reflect the increasing institutionalization tendencies among the liberal democratic nation-states in the Indo-Pacific region (ORF, 2021). The necessity to revivify the global supply chain resilience in an era of segmented globalization has been internalized by the Quad nations, as India, Japan, and Australia have teamed up for the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), reiterating the normative quotient of the Indo-Pacific by coming together to foster economic cooperation for their mutual benefit, while India and Australia have emphasized the significance of SCRI in their two-plus-two ministerial meeting’s joint statement in September 2021 (Pulipaka & Musaddi, 2021). Mastering a cooperative, consultative, and inclusive framework underlying India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, will be a necessity in the future, whereby a diverse spectrum of policy proposals and initiatives ranging from government- to-government dialogues and workshops to people-to-people, civil society, institutional and organizational linkages, increasingly informal conversations to full-fledged institutionalized cooperation following bottom-up and top- down approaches, like bolstering inter-ministerial coordination and promoting infrastructure development, and connectivity in the maritime domain, will

mitigate traditional and non-traditional security challenges (Saha & Mishra, 2020). Considering India’s vast territorial expanse, gargantuan size, widening strategic interests, resource capabilities, and innate capacities, India is likely to spearhead the herculean task of post-pandemic global revival, especially in the maritime realm, the domain of climate change mitigation, and vaccine diplomacy (Chatham House, 2021). Macroscopically, while India will continue to promote stability, maritime security and prosperity; support and maintain the rules-based international and regional order; contribute proactively towards a free, open, inclusive, pluralistic, and resilient Indo-Pacific; promote equity and fairness of globalization in the near future, it is very likely to continue developing robust issue-specific partnerships as per its SAGAR and IPOI vision, while strengthening freedom of navigation and overflight in compliance with International Maritime Law, thereby providing active assistance for capacity-building and capability development (ORF, 2021). In the future, India’s broad approach towards the Indo-Pacific must involve enhancing cooperation to address challenges like terrorism, cyber and illicit trafficking, piracy, organised crime, migration; collaboration on disaster resilience and management; pro-actively contributing to climate, new technologies, health, employment and the development of the Blue Economy; bolstering security, defence, and naval cooperation (Carnegie Live, 2020). India must advance a resilient development paradigm in mitigating the ramifications of the pandemic-induced humanitarian crisis by increasing its institutional competence, fostering economic diplomacy by encouraging domestic and foreign policy reforms, establishing a harmonious balance between cooperation and competition, aspirations and the achievable targets, and regional and global imperatives, and thus build substantial intellectual capital, secure market integration and capacity-building across governments, business organizations, and finally develop sophisticated knowledge bases in the Indo-Pacific nation- states (The Institute of World Politics, 2020). Thus, the ideal way forward for India must involve promoting a multi- layered approach to cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region while building inter- trade facilitation centres and using technology to construct responsive processes through improvements in industrial development, trade policies, negotiation, and bargaining power. Also, India’s capacity to construct new engines of growth and productivity like pharmaceuticals, automobile, and telecommunications sectors, India’s capability of dynamic engagement at granular and macro levels,

and effective institutional mechanisms for coordination and leadership will be integral in shaping its future policies in the Indo-Pacific (Menon, 2021, p.354).

Conclusion

The Indo-Pacific region is entering a decade where diplomatic effectiveness will be judged by tangible actions rather than rhetoric or formal declarations. India now occupies a position where its capacity for delivery can decisively influence regional outcomes. This moment presents both a significant responsibility and a strategic opportunity for India. The stability of the Indo- Pacific over the coming years depends on India evolving into a more capable, confident, and actively engaged power. To align with its strategic ambitions, India’s naval expansion must progress accordingly. Investments are needed in shipbuilding infrastructure, maintenance cycles, and maritime domain awareness systems to ensure integration and operational readiness. As India’s strategic responsibilities grow, refining decision-making and operational systems will be essential to maintain momentum. However, India’s international partners are more attuned to its consistent strengths—its willingness to engage, its ability to deliver specific capabilities, and its strategic resilience amidst global uncertainties. India’s strategic approach must embody a clear vision, decisive actions, and flexibility to adapt to shifting power dynamics. A secure, stable, and inclusive Indo-Pacific is not only a regional objective but also a core component of India’s aspirations to emerge as a leading global actor. Despite ongoing challenges related to capability limitations, geopolitical rivalry, and resource constraints, India’s multi-vector diplomacy and institutional engagements position it to effectively navigate the region’s complexities. Its role as a stabilising and constructive force depends on deepening regional partnerships, strengthening economic integration, and promoting inclusive governance. Ultimately, India’s Indo-Pacific strategy articulates a vision centered on partnership, coexistence, and shared prosperity. Thus, to conclude, India’s Indo-Pacific strategy fundamentally advocates for collaboration, coexistence, and mutual prosperity. Its effective implementation relies on pragmatic policy measures, flexible strategic approaches, and continuous diplomatic efforts.

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52. Scott, David. (2015). “The Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean.” The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi), 466–78. 53. Sen, Gautam. n.d. (2018) “How India Manages Its National Security: By Arvind Gupta · Indrastra Global Index.” https://www.autokrew.com/igi. indrastra.com/items/show/72. 54. The Institute of World Politics. “An Assessment of the Free and Open Indo- Pacific Strategy.” YouTube video, 1:05:51. (November 4, 2020). https://youtu. be/490yKd6og94. 55. The Wire, “India, Indo-Pacific and the QUAD,” YouTube video, 40:09, (April 21, 2019), https://youtu.be/0JrbPKFuJ30. 56. Vinodan, C., and A. Kurian. (2024). “Strategic Autonomy and India’s Hedging Policies in the Indo-Pacific.” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11: 475–95. https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970241282095. 57. World Economic Forum. “The Indo-Pacific Push.” YouTube video, 44:30. (October 4, 2019). https://youtu.be/wB8xjQVrye0. Dr Atreyee Mitra completed her Bachelor’s and Master’s in Political Science and International Relations at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, respectively, specialising in Southeast Asia. She completed her MPhil at the Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Calcutta. She is a Doctorate in Political Science with specialisation in International Relations. As a researcher/academician, she has contributed articles on strategy, focusing on geopolitical studies, international relations, and maritime security issues. She has participated in and presented papers in national and international seminars and has publications in journals and edited books Currently, she is Director, Internship Program, & Life Member of CENERS-K. She is also an Honorary Research Fellow at the Institute for Contemporary Chinese Studies (ICCS), Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala.